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INTRODUCTION 
This work is a contribution to the debate between realism and relatiVi~ 
in metaphysics. Realism is the thesis that there is a unique real world 
which exists independently of our perceiVing it and thinking about it. 
Furthermore, realism has it that the nature of the unique real world is 
as it is independently of how we perceive it to be, and of how our 
theories describe it. According to realism, to give a correct account 
of some constituent of the world, or of the world itself, is to present 
a God's Eye View of that constituent, or the world. There can only be 
one complete and correct account of the real world. The realist 
standpoint may also be referred to as the standpoint of objectiVity, or 
as the externalist perspective. 
RelatiVism is the thesis that the Real is relative to its 
being experienced and described. Furthenmore, the relatiVist holds that 
there are many different ways in which the Real is experienced and 
described; and hence, that there are many different real worlds. 
RelatiVism denies the posSibility of a God's Eye View: there just are 
different pOints of View -- that is, different ways of experiencing and 
describing the Real. The relatiVist standpoint may also be referred to 
as the standpoint of subjectiVity, or as the internalist perspective. 
OUr enquiry will proceed as a dialectic between realism and 
relati Vism. As the dialectic progresses, it is hoped that we will 
discover just what is at stake between realism and relativism. 
5 
CHAPTER 1 
LINGUISTIC FRAMEWORKS AND THE REAL WORLD 
A key concept in the developnent of our dialectic will be that of a 
linguistic framework. The tenn has been adopted from Rudolf carnapl. 
For the moment we shall not examine just what use Carnap makes of the 
concept: this will emerge later. However, we shall draw a distinction 
which Carnap does not make, between uses of the concept linguistic 
framework which have fairly mundane, uninteresting implications, and 
uses of the concept which have far deeper, more interesting 
implications -- particularly relativistic implications. In illustating 
the former kind, we might better understand what is not at issue between 
relativism and realiffin. Then, as the dialectic progresses, the deeper 
implications may emerge, and realist and relativist reactions to cases 
employing the concept in this way should lead us better to understand 
what the root of the realist-relativist dispute is. But for now let us 
begin with merely a vague characterization of a linguistic framework, 
and say that it is simply a portion of language. 
''Mundane'' linguistic fraIreworks 
A relativist might tender the following sentence as a statement of 
relati Viffin: 
1 Carnap, R., 'Empiriciffin, Semantics, and Ontology', in Meaning and 
Necessity, 2nd Ed., University of Chicago Press, 1947, 
1956, pp.205-221. 
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Different linguistic frameworks give rise to different world-
views. 
But, as this bare statement comes to us, its relativist connotations are 
far from self-evident. We shall investigate the statement and hope that 
eventually the relativist nature of it will become clear. 
Does the above statement mean that different linguistic 
frameworks give rise to different views of the same world -- the 
unique, real , objective world? That is, does this statement merely 
cla~ that knowledge/truth is perspectival that is, that there are 
different ways of correctly seeing the one real world, and hence 
different ways of describing the world? Surely this much is 
uncontroversial. I observe the glass of wine in front of me from a 
particular angle. It has a particular two-d~ensional image or shape 
from this angle, and the wine a particular colour. However, to someone 
else sitting in another part of the room, it has a quite different shape 
and colour. Nevertheless, we are both observing the same glass of wine: 
we simply have different perspectives of it. 
Furthermore, the concept of perspective, as we are using it 
here, can be extended. The basic concept is spatial, and concerns 
sight: we have different views of an object, depending on what angle we 
view it from. But the concept can be extended to include different 
"views" -- not just visual, but related to any of the senses, as well as 
the intellect and value systems -- arising from different interests and 
expertises. For example, if the other person were an expert wine 
taster, then she would have a different perspective from mine based on 
the smell and taste of the wine. She would know what area the grapes 
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came from, how the wine was made, the type of container the wine was 
matured in, and so on. Now suppose there were a third person in the 
room -- a physicist. She would have a different perspective of the Wine 
again. She might know its exact molecular composition, the sub-atOmiC 
explanation for its colour and chemical reactivity, and so on. Thus, 
there are any number of correct descriptions of the glass of wine. They 
can all be correct simultaneously without inconsistency. If any two 
descriptions were to contradict one another, or were to have 
contradictory implications, then we would conclude that at least one of 
them was not a correct description of the glass of wine. Thus far we 
have not encountered relativism. 
Now, what is the force of the tenm 'linguistic framework' in 
our statement? Does the wine taster in our example operate within a 
different linguistic framework from mine; and likewise the physicist? 
Well, as it happened, they did'; but they need not have. We all are 
capable of using any of several linguistic frameworks; some people are 
proficient in many more than others, as a result of more extensive 
education and training, and broader interests and opportunities . A 
linguistic framework is simply a portion of language suited to talking 
about some particular aspect of the world. There are linguistic 
frameworks especially suited to talking about the quality of wines, the 
micro-structure of matter, automotive mechanics, mathematics, politics, 
everyday life, and so on. Linguistic frameworks are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, and there can be many different orders of them: that 
is, there can be linguistic frameworks wi thin linguistic frameworks, 
Within linguistic frameworks again, and so on. For example, conSider 
the mathematical linguistic framework. There are many different 
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divisions and subdivisions of mathematics, each having its own more and 
more specialized linguistic framework, each framework being specially 
sui ted to different (mathematical) aspects of the world. Under the 
American Mathematical Society's classification of mathematics of 1979, 
there are approxirrately 3,400 sub-categories of mathematics1 . MY 
single mathematician would be familiar with at most two or three sub-
categories -- and each sub-category, of course, will have its own 
linguistic framework. So, returning to our previous example, our 
description of the second person observing the glass of wine as 'the 
wine taster' is not, of course, an exhaustive description of that 
person's being. She does not only ever speak as a wine taster -- that 
is, in that specialized linguistic framework. She could quite easily 
have been a physicist as well, and thus could have chosen to look at the 
wine from that perspective -- that is, she rrdght have chosen to describe 
it in its molecular or even sub-atorrdc structure. Or again, she may 
have decided to look at it from 'a purely everyday perspective and have 
commented that it happens to be a cheap and easy way of getting drunk, 
and tends not to produce too bad a hangover. 
Now, the importance of the notion of linguistic frameworks is 
in dealing with apparent contradictions. For example, an artist might 
say of our wine that its colour is just right. Our wine taster, on the 
other hand, might say that the colour is quite poor. Nevertheless, 
despi te this apparent contradiction, they rrdght well both be uttering 
simultaneously correct statements. This is because despite the fact 
1 Davis, P.J., and Hersh, R., The Mathematical Experience, Boston: The 
Harvester Press, 1981, pp.20,29-30. 
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that they are both considering the wine's colour, they are nevertheless 
each (we shall assume) considering it from a different perspective 
that is, wi thin a different linguistic framework. The artist is 
operating within an aesthetic linguistic framework. The colour is just 
right aesthetically speaking, with respect to the light and shade, and 
other colours surrounding it. The wine taster, however, is operating 
within the linguistic framework appropriate to wine tasting: to her, the 
colour is not right -- it indicates a bad wine. Thus, we can see how 
the two apparently contradictory statements can both be correct without 
inconsistency: they are made within different linguistic frameworks. We 
are here assuming that there is a fact of the matter as to whether the 
colour is aesthetically right, and a fact of the matter as to whether 
the colour indicates a poor quality wine.. Those who hold to a fact-
value distinction may be suspicious of this example, but its force 
certainly does not turn on any element of subjectivity. However, for 
those who still cannot accept this, conSider the following example. 
A tourist in a Third World country correctly asserts that a 
certain sample of water is pure after she has determined that it is not 
contaminated with harmful bacteria -- for example, she might have bOiled 
it for several minutes, or have had it tested for such bacteria. An 
experimental chemist, on the other hand, correctly states that this same 
sample is not pure. To her, only distilled water -- liquid composed 
entirely (or as closely as possible) of H20 molecules -- is pure water. 
Thus, once again we see that prima facie contradictory statements can be 
simultaneously correct if they are made wi thin different linguistic 
frameworks. Indeed, in each of the above two examples, the pair of 
statements could well have been made by the same person: someone 
10 
proficient in both linguistic frameworks. According to what we have 
seen so far, it is logically possible (though practically impossible, 
due to limited time and intellectual capacity) for a single person to be 
proficient in every linguistic framework employed by hurranity, and, 
without ever contradicting herself, to utter truth (that is, correct 
statement) after truth about the world. (We assume that she never makes 
rrdstakes, no matter what linguistic framework she is operating in.) As 
time approached. infinity, she would approach perfect knowledge of the 
world: that is, knowing everything about every aspect· of the world. 
Of course, as we have seen, for one to recognize that she 
never contradicts herself, one would need always to be aware of which 
particular linguistic framework she was making any given statement in, 
and be proficient in that linguistic framework. For, as the above 
examples indicate, the meaning of some words may differ from framework 
to framework. In an everyday ·linguistic framework, dealing with an 
everyday aspect of the world, in which our main concern with water is 
drinking to quench thirst and to maintain health, 'pure' means not 
contaminated with hannful substances or organisms. But in an 
experimental cherrdst's linguistic framework, which deals with an aspect 
of the world in which the concern is how particular cherrdcals behave 
under controlled condi tions , 'pure' means having no impuri ties 
whatsoever -- that is, in our case, containing nothing that is not H20 . 
As we have so far characterized it, the notion of a linguistic 
framework is hardly deep or interesting. Different linguistic 
frameworks deal with different aspects of the world or its constituents, 
or look at the world from different, though mutually consistent, 
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perspectives. Thus, so far as we have seen, there is no contradiction 
between correct statements in different linguistic frameworks. But 
returning to our relativist's statement, surely a relativist must mean 
more than just that different linguistic frameworks give rise to 
different, though compatible, views of the same world. When the 
statement is interpreted as we have done so far, it is hardly a 
statement of relativism. 
''Deep'' linguistic frarreworks 
However, now suppose that the object I am looking at is an ancient human 
bone at a sacred aboriginal burial site. (Note that the aborigines 
talked about in this example are not intended to be Australian 
Aborigines. ) I might consider the object from an archaeological 
standpoint, and state that it is .composed of such and such materials, is 
so and so many years old, and was part of a human being leading a normal 
tribal life in this area. However, to a second observer -- a member of 
the tribe descended from the ancient tribe of the same period as the 
bone -- the object is not simply an ancient bone composed of normal 
materials, once having belonged to a normal person. To her the bone 
once was a part of a supernatural being, and the bone itself now has 
supernatural powers and is not composed of normal earthly materials. 
Now, this case is not so easily dealt with as the previous 
examples. The two observers are certainly employing different 
linguistic frameworks from each other, but this time the difference 
between frameworks does not seem to lie simply in their dealing with 
I 
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different aspects of the same object. We shall suppose here, for the 
sake of argument, that translation between the aboriginal language and 
English is unproblematic. Thus, assume that both the aborigine and I 
mean the same by 'supernatural': say, the power magically to make a 
seriously sick person well when employed in an appropriate magical 
ritual. Thus, this is not a case of a merely apparent contradiction, as 
in the 'pure water' and 'right colour' cases: in this case there is a 
genuine explicit contradiction. I say that the object is a normal bone, 
having earthly constituents and no supernatural qualities. The 
aborigine contradicts this. What can we say about this situation? 
Clearly, if the aborigine and I are making statements about . 
the same object, then at least one of us must be wrong. Assume for the 
moment that my account of the bone is correct. What should we make of 
the aborigine's account? Has she simply made a mistake? Could I reason 
with her and show her that there is no evidence for her cla~ that the 
bone is supernatural? Could I convince her that her account is 
inconsistent with the empirical laws of n2ture, and thus convince her 
that she has perhaps made a blunder, or uncritically accepted a belief 
which, with a little careful reasoning, she could have seen to be 
incorrect? 
Clearly, it would .be quite misleading to see the aborigine as 
having made an avoidable mistake -- an isolated blunder. Her statements 
about the bone do not arise out of a lapse in her rationality, or a 
careless acceptance of beliefs. They are merely a typical part of an 
everyday linguistic framework; one which she shares with the other 
members of her culture. The view of the world arising from this 
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linguistic framework includes supernatural beings and objects. Her 
fellow tribespeople would adjudge her account of the bone as correct. 
That is not to say that one could not make a mistake wi thin that 
linguistic framework. A child might point to another human bone lying 
around, and state that it is a supernatural one; only to be told by the 
adults that she has made a mistake, and that she should pay more 
attention during her lessons. But our aboriginal observer has not made 
such a mistake. Judged. from within her linguistic framework she is 
perfectly correct. 
Now, the last sentence needs explaining. To do so we must 
first investigate a particular notion we have been using: correctness. 
What does it mean for a statement or description to be correct or true? 
The answer to this is simple: a statement is true or correct just if the 
situation that it states to obtain in the world does in fact obtain in 
the world. We are assuming that the unique real world exists 
independently of anyone's perception or description of it. A correct 
statement describes some part of the world just as it is in itself. 
Hence, 'Snow is white' and 'La neige est blanche' are true just if in 
the real world snow is white. Of C01ITSe, as we have seen in the 'right 
colour' and 'pure water' examples, one must recognize which linguistic 
framework a statement is made within, and be sufficiently proficient in 
that framework to be in a position to understand just what that 
statement asserts is the case in the real world. Nevertheless, once one 
does understand just what it is that the statement claims to be so, then 
in order to assess whether the statement is true or false one must 
determine of the independent real world whether it is as the statement 
claims it is. Now, as we have set up the bone case, there is no problem 
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as to the meaning of the statement claiming that t he bone is 
supernatural; for we have assumed that the aborigine and I meru! exactly 
the same by the teIIn 'supernatural' - or, more accurately , that the 
English statement 'This bone has supernatural qualities' is an accurate 
translation in every respect of the aborigine's statement. Thus , the 
aborigine's statements about the bone are false, or incorrect , since 
they do not accord With the real world: the bone did not once fOIIn part 
of a supernatural being, and nor does it have supernatural quali t i es 
now. 
But then, what was meant above when we said that judged from 
Wi thin her linguistic framework the aborigine is perfectly correct? 
Here our concept of a linguistic framework becomes deep and interesting . 
Statements such as 'This bone has supernatural qualities" are (we 
assume) quite appropriate to, perhaps even typical of, the aboriginal 
linguistic framework. Talk of supernatural beings and objects is an 
important part of the aborigine's culture; so much so that the questi on 
'Are there any supernatural powers?' would never arise for her. And if 
the question was put to her, then she would regard the answer as being 
self-eVidently affirmative. If pressed further, say With t he question 
'But how do you know they exist?', she might tell the questi oner to 
watch an aboriginal magical ritual in order to see such powers: in other 
words, she would simply produce an example of supernatural powers to 
answer the question. 
Here we begin to realize the force of the word 'framework'. 
The statement 'This bone has supernatural qualities' is not an i sol ated 
falsity, at odds with the rest of the aborigine's linguistic framework. 
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Such supernatural talk is an integral part of a framework. This 
linguistic framework presents the world in a particular way, though not 
necessarily in any detail. Amongst other things, it determines the 
categories into which things in the world are to be placed, or how the 
world is to be divided up; and, very importantly, it comes complete wit~ 
a 'style of reasoning'. This last tenn is Ian Hacking' sl. We shall 
investigate just what it means later. Now, once this linguistic 
framework has been accepted, the question as to whether there are any 
supernatural powers will not be raised, the answer being self-evidently 
affinnative. It is, however, a proper question to ask wi thin this 
linguistic framework whether a particular object or being has 
supernatural powers. To detennine the answer to such a question one 
must employ the style of reasoning tied up with the linguistic 
framework. For example, in our aborigine case it is a proper question 
within the aboriginal linguistic framework to ask of a particular bone 
whether it has supernatural qualities. If, say, the bone was found at a 
sacred aboriginal burial site, then by aboriginal reasoning this might 
prove that it does have supernatural qualities. 
World-views 
Now, the way the world is presented by the aborigine's linguistic 
framework is incompatible with the way our Western scientific linguistic 
framework presents the world. There are not just isolated contradictory 
1 Hacking, I., 'Language, Truth and Reason', in M. Hollis and S. Lukes 
(eds.), Rationality and Relativism, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1982, pp.48-66. 
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statements. The two linguistic frameworks each present a world-view i 
and these whole world-views · are incompatible. Now we can see what was 
meant by the cla~ that judged from Within her linguistic framework the 
aborigine is correct: in the world as presented by the aboriginal 
linguistic framework the bone does have supernatural qualities . Thus, 
once anyone accepts and operates Within the aborigine's linguistic 
framework, that person Will adjudge the statement attributing 
supernatural qualities to the bone as correct. 
From this it follows that if we, as subscribers to the Western 
scientific linguistic framework, want to maintain that there is only one 
real world, which different linguistic frameworks are used to describe, 
then we must conclude that the aborigine's world-View as a whole is 
incorrect. That is, the aborigine's world-View, or way of seeing the 
world (and that of her whole culture), is wrong-headed. She does not 
see the world as it actually is. At this deep level -- that is, where a 
linguistic framework gives rise to a world-View -- there can only be one 
correct linguistic framework, if we accept realism. Of course, as we 
have seen, at the shallow level there can be any number of different 
correct linguistic frameworks, since each framework deals with a 
different aspect of the world, rather than presenting a world-view. 
How do I know that my (that is, Western scientific) world-view 
is the correct one? Well basically, mine works and the aborigine's does 
not. That is, mine provides a more consistent and more precise 
explanation of a vastly Wider range of worldly phenomena. Also, the 
predictive capabilities of mine are far better and more successful. The 
vast difference in the explanatory and predictive success of our 
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respective world-views indicates that it is more than likely that mine 
is correct (approximately) and that hers is incorrect. 
Now, such mutual incompatibility between linguistic frameworks 
(or world-views) is not restricted to frameworks of different cultures. 
There are many totally different and mutually contradictory ways of 
seeing the world Within our Western scientific culture. For example, 
one may have a monistic View of the world (a la Spinoza): everything is 
but one substance manifested in many different ways. All the things we 
see as being individual existences are simply ·various modes of being of 
the one substance. On the other hand, someone else might have a 
pluralistic View of the world: the world is a collection of individual 
existents. Each person Will see the other's account of the world as 
wrong (though, perhaps, as a convenient fiction). Now, going along with 
what we have assumed so far -- that is, that there is one unique real 
world -- one and only one of these two world-Views is correct. That is, 
either there is only one substance, or there is more than one substance. 
But how are we to mow which of the two alternatives is 
correct? If we try to imagine in principle what would be eVidence for 
one world-View over the other, then it soon becomes clear that there can 
be no such objective or independent evidence. This is because any 
"evidence" Will be seen in terms of (that is, in the linguistic 
framework of) the world-view itself. Any data must be seen in some way 
or other -- that is, they are necessarily described in some particular 
terms or others. And how is each person to see/describe the data except 
according to her world-view, or in terms of her linguistic framework? 
Once one accepts the view that the world is the unique substance, then 
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anything at all that might be held up as evidence for pluralism Will 
simply be seen as a mode of that single substance. Since these two 
world-views do not share even the most basic data, we cannot know which 
of them is correct, even though we know that one of them must be 
correct. But this is a very strange state of affairs. Apparently, 
either the monist or the pluralist is correct; but whichever one is 
correct is so purely by chance, since there is no way of knowing for 
certain which view is correct. Indeed, there is no objective evidence 
possible which would enable us to assign even a greater probability of 
correctness to one view over the other. And given that, why is one 
person a monist and another a pluralist? That is, how did they come to 
hold their respective world-views as correct, when there is no reason to 
think that one or other is the correct one? 
Kuhn provides a plausible answer to this question1 . One 
learns to view the world in the way that is sanctioned by one's peers 
and teachers. Acquiring such a world-view is essential to one's 
becorrdng a member of the relevant community. Indeed, according to Kuhn, 
it is essential to one's full understanding of the statements of the 
communi ty that one shares that community's world-view (or linguistic 
framework) . This is because different world-views, or linguistic 
frameworks, are incommensurable; that is, there is no corrmon measure 
between different world-views. This means that they will admit 
different baSic data and employ different concepts; and even when ter.ms 
do coincide, the meanings of these terms will differ. Furthennore, what 
1 Kuhn, T. , The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
University of Chicago Press, 1962, 1970. 
2nd Ed., 
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is to be treated as an issue -- for example, what sentences qualify as 
candidates for a truth-value -- differs from framework to framework . 
Due to this incommensurability, one community cannot perceive 
as a possible alternative the world-View of a different community: the 
unfamiliar world-View (of the second community) is totally 
misunderstood, since it is interpreted in tenms of the first community's 
own world-View; and hence, statements of the second linguistic framework 
will seem either manifestly false or nonsensical to the first community . 
Our earlier example of the aborigine's world-View versus mine fits this 
account at least as well as the monism versus pluralism case. Both the 
aborigine and I have grown up With our respective world-Views. When 
each of us hears (the translation of) the other's account of the bone, 
we each perceive it as at best totally false, if not utter mumbo-jumbo . 
Neither of us can see the other's world-View as a Viable alternative to 
our own. 
The model we have so far presupposed is of a unique, 
independent, objective world, of which there can only be one complete, 
totally correct account. From such presuppositions it follows that if 
different world-Views are each correct, then each must be a view of a 
different aspect of that unique world. Taken all together, every 
possible correct world-View -- if completely worked out -- would give a 
complete account of the world. There cannot be different correct views 
of the same aspect of the world, or of the world as a whole, as we 
argued in the two cases mentioned above. Such a model is what Hilary 
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Putnam refers to as 'hard-core realism,l . 
Are the implications of such realism plausible? Take the 
rnonismrpluralism case. Is it really the case that one will be either a 
monist or a pluralist, and that a monist cannot see plurali sm as a 
coherent alternative world-view (and vice versa)? This is clearly not 
the case. Probably most of us are "brought up" as pluralists; but after 
a thoughtful reading of, say, Parmenides or Spinoza, we might come to 
see the world rnonistically. Thus, the incommensurability of world-views 
does not make it impossible to understand a world-view different from 
one's own. After all, we claimed earlier that monism and pluralism are 
equally valid ways of seeing the world; and that there are no good 
reasons for holding one to be correct and the other incorrect. Surely 
to recognize this we must adequately understand both world-views: that 
. 
is, we must be able to see the world at one time pluralistically, and at 
another monistically. 
But once we have achieved this, then it becomes difficult t o 
persist with hard-core realism. That is, it becomes hard to believe 
that, despite all we have said, either monism or pluralism is the 
correct way of viewing the world, and the other -is incorrect. Rather , 
it seems much more plausible to hold that both are correct ways to view 
the world. Each world-view will provide a complete and correct 
description of any particular object in the world. The descri pti ons 
Will of course be completely different, but they will be equivalent. It 
1 Putnam, H., 'Realism and Reason', in Meaning and the Moral Sci ences , 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p.131 . 
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is analogous to the way that the earth can be rrapped by different 
projections -- such as the Mercator and the Polar1 . It is a property of 
the real world itself that it' adrni ts of these different rrappings ' 2 . 
Putnam calls this model 'sophisticated realism,3. Thus, for example, a 
pluralist might point to an object and say: 'This is Robert J. Hawke, an 
individual existent, a substance'. A monist, however, would say of the 
same object: 'It is merely a mode of being of the one substance -- that 
is, the unique substance is rranifested in this instance in the mode of 
Robert J. Hawke'. 
RelatiVism 
Putnam holds that there is a serious problem With sophisticated realism: 
it is that although we succeed in retaining the unique real world, the 
price we pay is that we give up any intelligible notion of how the world 
is. Putnam writes: 
'Any sentence that changes truth-value upon passing from one 
correct theory [linguistic framework/world-view] to another 
correct theory - e. g. an equivalent description - will 
express only a theory-relati ve property of THE WJRLD. And the 
more such sentences that there4are, the more properties of THE WORLD Will be theory-relative' . 
In our monis.mrpluralism case, the property being-an-entity, or being-a-
substance, Will be theory-relative (or world-view-relati ve, or 
1 This illuminating analogy is Putnam's: see ibid., p.132. 
2 Ibid., p.132. 
3 Ibid., P .132. 
4 Ibid., P .132. 
) 
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linguistic-frarnework-relative). In 'Realism and Reason' Putn~ provides 
an example of equivalent descriptions of the world which demonstrates 
that the property being-an-object (as opposed. to a class or set of 
things) is theory-relative; and even that the cardinality of the world 
is also theory-relative. Such examples lead Putn~ to rrake the 
following claim: 
'The fact is, so many properties of THE WORLD -- starting with 
just the categorical ones, such as cardinality, particulars, 
or universals, etc. -- turn out to be 'theory-relative' that 
THE IDRID ends up as a Kantian 'noumenal' world, a mere 
'thing-in-itself'. If one cannot say how THE IDRLD is theory-
independently, then talk10f all these theories as descriptions 
of 'the world' is empty' . 
Hence, sophisticated realism, like hard-core realism, is untenable. 
-Here, at last, we encounter fully-fledged (though not self-
confessed) relativism. For in Putn~' s statement we give up the idea 
that a world-view is a view of the world. It is at best a (or perhaps 
the) view of a world. Now, at · last, we are able to appreciate the 
relativistic import of our original statement of relativism: 
Different linguistic fr~eworks give rise to different world-
views. 
We can join Kuhn and rrake the point that different corrmuni ties of 
people, employing different linguistic fr~eworks -- Kuhn uses the term 
'paradigm' here -- in a very real sense 'live in different worlds,2. I 
live in a different world from that in which lives the aborigine of our 
earlier example. Her world includes supernatural objects and beings; 
mine does not. Of course, it must be remembered that it is by no means 
1 Ibid., p.133. 
2 Kuhn, op.cit., p.193. 
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always the case that any two linguistic frameworks Will identify 
different worlds: it is only in the deep sense of the tenn that this is 
so. It still makes perfect sense to have different linguistic 
frameworks sui ted for discourse about different aspects of the same 
world - that is, two such (mundane) linguistic frameworks would be 
parts of a larger (deep) linguistic framework, identifying and 
characterizing a world. 
Given such relatiVism, does it make any sense to distinguish 
between correct and incorrect, or true and false statements; or does 
"anything go"? Well, although we have seen that there is no unique 
theory-independent world With which 'a statement can accord \. -- and in 
Virtue of that be true or correct -- nevertheless, our corrmon sense 
account of truth can be perfectly well applied Wi thin any linguistic 
framework. But prior to seeing how this can be done, we should exarrdne 
more closely Hacking's notion of a 'style of reasoning' . 
In 'Language, Truth and Reason' Hacking distinguishes between 
subjectiVism and relatiVism. The characterization he chooses for 
subjectiVism is that by thinking we might either make something true, or 
make it false. Such a doctrine he rightly holds to be patently wrong. 
What concerns Hacking is relatiVism, which he characterizes as follows: 
'by thinking, new candidates for truth and falsehood may be brought into 
being,l; or in other words, 'whether a proposition is as it were up for 
grabs, as a candidate for being true-or-false, depends on whether we 
1 Hacking, op.cit., p.49. 
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have ways to reason about it ,1 . Hacking argues that there are rrany 
different styles of reasoning which can be discerned and their 
developments traced. Some die out, whereas others persist. 
An example Hacking gives of a style of reasoning different 
from. our own is that of the Renaissance medical, alchemical and 
astrological doctrines of resemblance and similitude. He argues that 
our modern notion of evidence is totally lacking in this style of 
reasoning. He gives the following example of how this style of 
reasoning proceeds: syphilis is transmitted in the marketplace, which is 
signed by the planet Mercury, which also signs the element mercury, 
which therefore might be effective against syphilis. 
Hacking argues that what we must focus on, in attempting to 
understand such foreign writings, is not what the writers held to be 
true, but rather what they conSidered to be the possibilities for truth-
or-falsehood, and the procedures of reasoning that produce these 
possibilities. In translating from such foreign writings, the guiding 
principle should not be to maxirrUze the number of propositions held to 
be true in both the foreign and our own doctrines. 
few such propositions, and, more importantly, 
There will be very 
the reasons these 
propositions are held true in the foreign writings will atmost certainly 
be completely different from the reasons we hold them. true. Rather, 
what we should attempt to do in translating a foreign text is to 
discover how the writer reasoned: that is, how she came to propose the 
proposi tions in the text, and how she defended them. If we do not 
1 Ibid. I p. 48 . 
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examine the propositions of a foreign text in the light of the style of 
reasoning which gave rise to those propositions -- that is, if we simply 
pass judgment on the translations of the bare propositions then most 
of these propositions Will be held not so much false, as absurd: just 
not the kind of thing that we would even consider. As Hacking says, 
'It is not that the propositions rratch ill With our modern 
sciences, so much as that the way WopOSi tions are proposed 
and defended is entirely alien to us' . 
Thus, Hacking argues, 'Understanding is learning how to reason,2. 
Let us again take as an example our imaginary aborigine case. 
It might well be totally appropriate for the aborigine to reason in the 
folloWing way: the bone was found by an elder at a sacred site, where it 
was pointing in a particular significant direction; and therefore it has 
supernatural powers. Now, the aboriginal culture's style of reasoning, 
of which this is an example, creates particular possibilities or 
candidates for truth-or-f~lsehood, which our Western style of reasoning 
does not. For the aborigines, it is an issue whether or not particular 
objects have supernatural powers: some do and some do not. The style of 
reasoning which produces examples such as we have given above, and the 
concept of supernatural power as possessed by particular objects which 
is part of that style of reasoning, are essential to the aborigines' 
world-View. That is, if an aborigine consistently failed to understand 
or to accept such reasoning, then she would be quite out of step with 
her culture and its world-View -- she would be seen to be mentally ill, 
or divorced from reality. I am imagining here an aborigine who refuses 
1 Ibid., p. 60. 
2 Ibid., p. 60 . 
26 
to take part in any magical ceremonies, and never uses or responds to 
any supernatural language -- as distinct from someone who might dispute 
particular cases of purported supernatural powers, refuting the 
particular instances of reasoning. 
The style of reasoning of our Western scientific linguistic 
framework does not allow examples of reasoning such as we have given 
above. In consequence, that any particular object has such supernatural 
powers is simply not a candidate, or possibility, for truth-or-
falsehood -- the concept is not in currency in our world-view. By this 
I do not mean merely that our world-view dictates that no object has 
supernatural powers. Rather, what I mean is that our style of reasoning 
does not produce examples of reasoning which would conclude with either 
'This bone has supernatural powers', or 'This bone does not have 
supernatural powers'. The issue does not arise in our world-view 
whether or not a particular object has such supernatural powers (except 
perhaps in the special case of when we are considering the statements 
and style of reasoning of the aboriginal culture). Clearly, if someone 
in our culture were to present an argument like the aborigine's above, 
for the cla~ that a particular bone had supernatural powers, then that 
person would be adjudged crazy -- to have lost touch with reality. But 
furthennore, I would also hold that if someone were to take this 
person's argument seriously, and, in response, to present an argument 
With the conclusion that some particular bone did not have such 
" --
supernatural powers, then this would rightly be seen to be pretty 
strange behavior too. The issue i~ simply not the kind of thing our 
culture is concerned with and reasons about. 
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Now, it ma.y be objected here that there are rare cases in 
which we might be inclined to express the proposition denying the 
existence of supernatural powers in objects, just as there are r are 
cases in which we might deny the existence of a perpetuum mobile. That 
is, the objector is arguing that although in the scientific world-view 
supernatural powers, like perpetua mobile, are impossible, this does not 
mean that the two concepts are not employed by us, in reasoning about 
the issues of our culture. For example, a child, or simply a person 
without a scientific education, ma.y ask whether a particular object will 
keep moving forever. And sirrrrlarly, after reading storybooks a child 
might ask whether a particular object has ma.gical or supernatural 
powers. Now, in the case of the perpetuum mobile, I think we can all ow 
that the concept has currency in our world-view; that it is an issue fo r 
us -- albeit one that is definitively decided. This is because our 
style of reasoning includes examples of reasoning which employ t he 
concept, if only as an unattainable lirrrrt, and thus creates the 
possibility of truth-or-falsehood regarding the perpetuum mobile. 
However, the case of supernatural powers i s different . The 
general meaning of the concept of supernatural or ma.gical power in our 
culture's mythology is an active force outside of the natural physical 
laws. Now, if the question was asked whether a particular object has 
supernatural powers in this sense, then we might answer that it does not 
(though I hold that we would probably first insist on some clarification 
of the question, because it would initially strike us as absurd) . But 
what Hacking's argument shows is that the concept we would thereby be 
employing would not be the same as the aborigines' concept whi ch we 
translate as 'supernatural'. (Here, of course, the supposition we made 
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(p.12) of the accuracy of translation, for the sake of argument, becomes 
problerra ti c. ) The concept that the aborigines employ is essentially 
bound up With the kind of reasoning which is appropriate to it. Such 
reasoning, and the associated concept, are never employed in our world-
View. The translation of the aborigines' concept as ' supernatural ' 
reflects our interpretation and judgement of their concept. That is, we 
notice how they employ the concept and how they treat the bone -- for 
example, treating it With reverence, and focussing all attention on it 
in significant rituals, etc. -- and we rrake the judgement that the 
powers the bone is supposed to have are super-natural ones. But in the 
aborigines' world-View such powers rray well be perfectly natural -- the 
only kind that there is. We must not rrQstake the aborigines' concept 
for our concept supernatural, which is tied up With our style of 
reasoning. If we study the aborigines' style of reasoning, "including 
how they reason about "supernatural" powers, then we Will see that it is 
just not a possibility for truth-or-falsehood in our world-View that an 
object has supernatural powers in the aborigines' sense. And thus, we 
cannot adjudge as true or false the aborigines' statement about the bone 
from Within our linguistic framework. 
One srrall point of criticism I have of Hacking is that he 
rejects Kuhn's and Feyerabend's tenn 'incommensurability' as being too 
closely tied to translation, rather than reasoning. According to 
Hacking, 'incommensurable' means that there is 'no "way of translating 
from one scheme to another,l. However, Kuhn does not use the tenn in 
this sense at all. True, for Kuhn, people operating within 
I Ibid., p. 59 . 
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incorrmensurable world-views are participants in a corrmuni cation 
breakdown, but from what we have already seen of Hacking's view we can 
see that he would have to agree with Kuhn in that respect. And further, 
what Kuhn advocates that we do when faced with such a corrmuni cation 
breakdown is 'recognise each other as members of different language 
corrmunities and then become translators,l. Such translation 'allows the 
partiCipants in a corrmunication breakdown to experience vicariously 
something of the merits and defects of each other's pOints of view,2. 
Thus, clearly 'incorrmensurable' does not mean the same as 'no way of 
translating' . 
Furthennore, Kuhn goes on to say the following: 
'To translate a theory or worldview into one's own language i s 
not to make it one's own. For that one must go nati ve, 
discover that one is thi,nking and working in, not S~lY 
translating out of, a language that was previously foreign' . 
Now, I think that the above passage clearly indicates that Kuhn 
recognizes that what is important when considering the translation of 
the writings of a different linguistic framework is much more than that 
the propositions 'match ill' with our own. His reference to 'thinking 
and working in' the new language is strongly rerniniscient of Hacking 's 
notion of learning 'how to reason in a new way'. Hence, I think 
'incorrmensurability' is still a useful tenn i n our debate here. 
However, I do think that Hacking's notion of styles of reasoning , and 
his emphasis on what are possibilities for truth-or-falsehood, r ather 
1 Kuhn, 012. cit. , p.202. 
2 Ibid . , p.202. 
3 Ibid. , p.204. 
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than what is held true, successfully identify just how world-views are 
incorrrnensurable . 
Relativism and truth 
Now let us return to the question of how, despite relativism, our common 
sense account of truth can be applied to linguistic frameworks. As we 
have seen, a particular linguistic framework in an important sense 
identifies and characterizes a world. Among other things, it defines 
what is to be accepted as data, and provides a style of reasoning. Now, 
for a statement made within a certain linguistic framework to be true, 
it must state that a certain situation obtains in the world identified 
by that linguistic framework, and that situation must actually obtain in 
that world. In practice, for us to dete~ne whether a given statement 
is true or false, first we must be· operating in the appropriate world --
that is, we must employ the same linguistic framework as that from which 
the given statement comes. Then it is simply a matter of perceiving the 
relevant data and reasoning from it (using the style of reasoning which 
comes with the linguistic framework) to see whether the world is as the 
statement says it is. Returning to our earlier example, the aboriginal 
child's claim that a certain human bone is a supernatural one is either 
true or false in her culture's world. It will be true just if it is in 
fact the case that the indicated bone has supernatural qualities. This 
can be determined by considering the relevant data -- say, where it was 
found, what it has been used for, and so on -- and then using the 
appropriate style of reasoning to determine whether the bone is 
supernatural: for example, as we have supposed above, the bone might 
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have been found by an elder at a sacred site, pointing in a significant 
direction, and have subsequently been used in magical ceremonies of the 
tribe, which by aboriginal reasoning might mean that it must have 
supernatural qualities. It must be stressed here that the statement 
'This bone has supernatural qualities' can be true when uttered in the 
aborigine's linguistic framework. That is, in the world identified by 
that linguistic framework there are some bones which really have 
supernatural qualities. For obvious reasons, Putnam calls this model 
'internal realism'. This is to be contrasted With metaphysical 
realism -- With its hard-core and sophisticated versions - which we 
have seen from our own and Putnam's arguments to be untenable (pp. 20-
22) . 
Putnam claims that internal realism is all we need: that is, 
life, and in particular enquiry, proceeds as well as it ever has Without 
the metaphysical realist model. . Certainly this is so for those who 
never attempt to understand statements made outside of their own 
linguistic framework. For, as we have seen, people that share a 
particular linguistic framework thereby share a particular world; so 
enquiry simply consists in their investigating the way the world is 
and this is indistinguishable from the way enquiry is conceived in the 
metaphysical realist model. But, of course, we are somet~es presented 
With translations of statements made Within linguistic frameworks other 
than our own. Thus, suppose I (a Westerner) am presented with the 
following translation of a statement made by the aborigine: 'This bone 
has supernatural qualities'. Interpreted Within my linguistic framework 
the statement is false. On the other hand, I may be sufficiently 
acquainted With the aboriginal linguistic framework, and the style of 
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reasoning essential to it, to know that within that linguistic framework 
the aborigine's actual (untranslated) statement is true -- that is, that 
in the aborigine's world this bone does indeed have supernatural 
qualities. Now, although statements made within one linguistic 
framework are often interpreted and adjudged true or false within 
another linguistic framework, such a practice necessarily involves a 
mistake. By failing to interpret a statement in terms of the linguistic 
framework in which it is made, one fails to understand the statement 
made. When one interprets it in terms of one's own linguistic 
framework, and then adjudges it as true or false, one is in fact dealing 
with a quite different statement (irrespective of whether it turns out 
to be true or false). The only way one can correctly adjudge a 
statement is to do so in terms of the linguistic framework in which it 
is made -- that is, by considering the relevant data admitted by that 
linguistic framework, and employing the style of reasoning of that 
framework. 
Metaphysical realism versus relativism 
Now, I think that the most common reaction to such relatiVism will be 
total dissatisfaction. Such dissatisfaction will arise from the 
perSistence of the metaphysical realist model. A metaphYSical realist 
might grant that different world-Views are incommensurable; and that, 
hence, a statement can only be adjudged according to the world 
identified by the linguistic framework wi thi!1. which the statement is 
made. She might further grant that different linguistic frameworks 
identify and characterize different worlds. However, she will emphasize 
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that these are merely worlds-as-characterized-by-linguistic-frameworks. 
There is, she will insist, a unique language-(theory-)independent world: 
the real world. Worlds characterized by different linguistic frameworks 
will each, to a greater or lesser degree, resemble this real language-
independent world. Thus, although a statement can only be adjudged 
within its own linguistic framework, the linguistic framework itself 
can, to a greater or lesser extent, be correct -- that is, accord with 
the real world. Accepting for the moment that the metaphysical realist 
model is correct, the question is again: can we -- and if so, how do 
we -- tell that one linguistic framework is more correct than another? 
Earlier we said that my Western linguistic framework works 
better than the aborigine's -- that is, it proVides a more consistent 
and more precise explanation of a vastly wider range of worldly 
phenomena, 
successful. 
and its predictive capabilities are far better and more 
From this we inferred. that my linguistic framework is more 
correct -- that is, that my world resembles the real world more closely. 
But are we justified in making such an inference? I think not. All we 
have succeeded in showing is that my world is more sophisticated than 
the aborigine's world: we have not shown that the real world is thus 
sophisticated. For, all the data that our Western linguistic framework 
is seen to handle better are only data within our linguistic framework. 
The aborigine does not recognize them as data to be accounted for. The 
aborigine's linguistic framework is perfectly adequate for handling the 
aborigine's world (that is, the world as characterized by that 
linguistic framework). Criticisms such as that the aborigine's account 
relies on magical explanation, mystifies rather than clarifies, is 
inconsistent, etc., are all made in terms of our linguistic framework. 
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They are dependent upon our style of reasoning i based on our data. 
Thus, they do not tell on the aborigine's linguistic framework . To 
adjudge which of a set of rival worlds-as-characterized-by-li nguistic-
frameworks most closely resembles the independent real world, we must 
first be able to compare them With this world. Hence, we must be able 
to characterize this real world independently of all lingui stic 
frameworks -- but this, of course, is impossible. 
The criterion of technological control 
The metaphysical realist might argue for one more criterion for 
deteDmining which world-View most correctly represents the independent 
real world. The criterion is the degree of technological control 
facilitated by particular world-Views. That is, the greater the 
technological control facilitated by any particular world-View, the more 
correctly that world-view represents the independent real world . An 
argument for the validity of this inference can be found i n Charles 
Taylor's 'Rationality,l. Taylor claims the following: 
'There is an inner connexion between understanding the worl d 
and achieVing technological control which rightly corrmands 
everyone's atte~ion, and doesn't just justify our practices 
in our own eyes' . 
Taylor makes a few observations in support of this cla~. He pOints out 
that our ordinary pre-scientific understanding of our envi ronment is 
inseparable from an ability to make our way around in it and deal with 
1 Taylor, C., 'Rationality', in M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds .) , op .cit., 
pp.87-105. 
2 Ibid., p. 101 . 
35 
it. Among other things, this accounts for rrany distinctions we make 
among objects in our environment -- for example, between edible and non-
edible. Now, Taylor argues that given these circumstances it is clear 
that an increase in scientific Jmowledge beyond this pre-scientific 
practical understanding cannot fail to present recipes for more 
effective practice. For example, once we discover the properties which 
make things edible, we cannot fail to notice that certain objects are 
edible which we hitherto had not suspected were sq. Taylor writes: 
'The basic point is that given the kind of beings we are, 
embodied and active in the world, and given the way that 
scientific Jmowledge extends and supersedes our ordinary 
understanding of things, it is impossible to see how it could 
fail t~ yield further and more far-reaching recipes for 
action' . . 
He then goes on to argue that further and more far-reaching recipes for 
action, when applied, are precisely increased technological control. 
And thus, Taylor believes that he has an argument for the superiority 
(with respect to the understanding of the world) of our scientific 
world-view, over the world-views of non-scientific cultures, which 
members of those other cultures must listen to. Taylor puts this 
argument in what he says is almost modus tollens: 
, ... there is no scientific advance without increased 
technological applicability; but in your case [the case of a 
non-scientific culture] we see no incrZased technological 
application; so you are making no advance' . 
Now, Taylor admits that as the argument stands it is not 
conclusive -- hence, his saying that it is only almost in modus tollens 
fOIm. As it is stated, there is a shift from 'applicability' to 
1 Ibid., p.10l. 
2 Ibid., p. 102. 
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'application'. This shift provides a gap in the argument through which 
a non-scientific culture rray try to escape Taylor's conclusion. For 
example, consider a culture which purports to be totally disinterested 
in technological control; perhaps, like tradi tional Platonists, 
regarding the physical world as hardly worth being worried about. 
Granted, even these people's genuine lack of interest Will not save them 
from noticing the spectacular degree of technological control which our 
scientific culture has . Their line against Taylor Will be that they 
simply do not bother carrying through their knowledge about the world 
into action upon the world. That is, they Will dispute the apparent 
inference from lack of actual technological application to lack of 
technological applicability -- that is, potential for application. In 
other words, they cla~ that they could achieve at least as spectacular 
a degree of technological control as we do, if only they could be 
bothered putting their minds to it. 
Of course, the gap in Taylor's argument can easily be 
el~nated by changing the second premise in the "almost" modus tollens 
fODm to read 'we see no increased technological applicability'. Then we 
would need to examine the non-scientific culture, and to interrogate its 
members, in order to ascertain whether there is increased technological 
applicability being generated by its knowledge of the world. That is, 
even if we accept that the culture genuinely has no interest in 
technological control, Taylor's argument Will not be answered unless the 
culture provides recipes for action, or at least potential recipes for 
action, which, if followed, would produce effective technological 
control. However, unlike modern scientific culture, which generates 
such recipes readily and in abundance, this culture does not (we 
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assume); and nor are there any potential recipes in its account of the 
world. Thus, the metaphysical realist can conclude, by Taylor's 
argument, that science's understanding of the world is superior to that 
of this non-scientific culture. 
Now, the strength of the criterion of (potential) 
technological control, embodied in Taylor's argument, is that it is not 
easily dismissed with the comment that the criterion is only important 
within the scientific world-View, and that Taylor's argument is only 
valid wi thin the scientific style of reasoning. Taylor makes out a 
plausible case for belieVing that anyone, irrespecti ve of the culture 
she is operating in, first will notice the spectacular degree of 
technological control that our scientific culture has; secondly, will 
wonder as to the explanation of this degree of control; and thirdly, as 
a result of these, will presume that science has got things right about 
the way the world is, and that her · own culture correspondingly has not. 
Thus, the force of Taylor's argument against the relatiVist is that 
styles of reasoning are not so diffArent that the universal recognition 
of the fact of science's technological superiority will not universally 
lead to the presumption of science's haVing got things right about the 
world, in a sense in which other cultures have not. According to 
Taylor, the only reasonable explanation for science's superior 
technological control is the one science gives: \ that it has greatly 
advanced our understanding of the material world,l. 
Now, if the cla~ is correct that the recognition of the fact 
1 Ibid., p.103. 
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of science's spectacular technological superiority will universally 
create at least the presumption of the superiority of science ' s 
understanding of the independent real world, then Taylor will have 
provided the metaphysical realist With a very strong argument against 
the relativist. If the cla~ is correct, then degree of technological 
control, or at least, degree of potential technological control, will be 
an adequate criterion for detennining which world-view most correctly 
represents the independent real world. However, I hold that the claim 
is not correct. I believe that we can quite easily envisage a perfectly 
plausible world-view, the holders of which will certainly notice 
science's spectacular degree of technological control, and yet for whom 
such recognition Will not create even the presumption in favour of 
science's account of how the world is. Indeed, we shall now outline a 
perfectly plausible world-view for which such a recognition creates 
quite the contrary presumption. 
Imagine our aboriginal tribe again. (Note again that the 
culture we are irragining here is not intended to be that of the 
Australian Aborigines, some of whom in fact did engage in environmental 
control, such as scrub burning.) Suppose the aborigines are nomads who 
keep no anirrals and grow no crops, but eXist solely by hunting and 
foraging. Suppose further that they see their whole environment as 
being the body of a powerful spirit who provides them With their needs, 
so long as they respect it and its body through right action. Right 
action might consist in part of accepting what is offered by the spirit, 
taking only what is offered, and giving back what the spirit requires, 
when it requires it. Now, such a culture might well reason from the 
fact of science's spectacular superiority of technological control that 
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science has got things wrong regarding the world -- and here I do not 
mean morally wrong. The aborigines' point of view would be that science 
has misunderstood the physical world. We have failed to see that the 
world is a being, a "conscious" organism. We have failed to see how the 
being provides our needs - I am thinking here of how poorly we 
scientific Westerners would fare in the outback deserts of Australia, 
which provide all of the needs of certain tribes of nomadic Australian 
Aborigines. Because of this lack of knowledge we have thought it 
necessary and desirable to control and to modify our environment. 
Despite the spectacular degree to which modem science has accomplished 
these aims, the aborigine, we shall assume, still holds that science's 
whole endeavour is wrong-headed -- and ultiIrately doomed to failure. 
Suppose that the aboriginal culture holds that because the environment 
is an organism, any attempts at modifying it, no matter how well 
considered and skilfully executed, will result in the environment's 
eventual destruction. Even humail life prolongation by technological 
advances are considered wrong-headed by the aborigines since this is in 
effect tampering with the t~e that is best for particular persons to 
return to the world-spirit: hence, it is just another case of 
contributing to the death of the world through ignorance. 
Now, what we have just described here is a plausible example 
of a culture which takes notice of modem science's technological 
superiority, and yet for whom this does not create even the presumption 
against its own understanding of the physical world, in favour of that 
of modem science; indeed, quite the contrary. Thus, Taylor's argument 
loses its apparent uni versali ty . There is not only one reasonable 
inference that can be drawn from science's spectacular degree of 
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technological control: namely, that science has a superior understanding 
of the independent real world. This may be the only reasonable 
inference if one is operating With certain styles of reasoning; but we 
have just seen that there may well be other styles of reasoning in which 
the contrary inference is appropriate. 
Thus, any metaphysical realist employing Taylor's argument for 
the superiority of science's understanding of the world Will remain wide 
open to the relativist's counter that any such judgment of superiority 
Will be a culture-based, or world-view-based one; that is, justified 
only Within a (or some) particular style(s) of reasoning. And 
therefore, we can conclude that the degree of (potential) technological 
control facilitated by a world-view fails as a criterion for determining 
which world-view most correctly represents the independent real world. 
The debate continues 
So, must we finally reject the notion of a language-independent real 
world, and admit that all there is is a myriad of linguistic-framework-
characterized worlds, which are incorrmensurable and, hence, between 
which there can be no meaningful discourse? 
a model remains deeply dissatisfying. 
Despite our arguments such 
That there is no unique, 
language-independent, real world, over and above the plurality of 
language-characterized worlds, contradicts what would seem to be a 
fundamental intuition. From where did the st~ulus come to construct a 
linguistic framework, thereby identifying and constructing a world? And 
if all linguistic activity were to cease (say, through the anihilation 
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of hurrani ty) , thereby putting an end to all language-characterized 
worlds, would there be nothing left? Such considerations seem very 
telling on the attempt to reject metaphysical realism. For surely it 
can only be the independent real world which initially stimulated us to 
fonn a linguistic framework; and surely, if hurranity were to vanish, 
this independent real world (rrdnus hurranity) would remain. 
So, let us once again grant that there is a unique, 
independent, real world, and recap on our objections to the metaphysical 
realist model; and then we shall see if that model can be modified to 
accommodate both our metaphysical realist intuitions, and all that is 
persuasive in the arguments of the relativist. Each linguistic 
framework claims to provide the (approximately) correct description of 
the world. However, there are many different incommensurable accounts 
of the world. This incommensurability means that there can be no 
mutually acceptable criterion by ' which to detennine which account is 
correct. And therefore, the point that there is nevertheless some 
objective criterion which detennines that one particular account is in 
fact correct, is problematic. For what could such a "criterion" amount 
to, except the bare fact that that particular account accords with the 
world? Any attempt at justifying the claim to correctness will only 
have force within the linguistic framework concerned. Thus, given that 
only one account can be correct, then the people that do in fact have 
the correct account of the world do so for no good objective reasons. 
That their account is correct, and all others incorrect, is simply a 
bare fact: an accident, so to speak. Now, such a model, as we have 
already commented, has little or no plausibility (and certainly no 
appeal). Thoughtful consideration of other linguistic frameworks will 
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soon wea~en one's con~ction that all accounts of the world other than 
one's own are incorrecc. Eowever, I do not think that we must now and 
:orever re ~ect metaphysical ::ealism and look back to the counter-
intuitive relatiVism as the only alternative model. Ra ther , I think 
~hat the metaphysical rea_ist model might possibly De altered to resolve 
our mi sgi Vings . To this end it will be helpful to rrake a brief 
excursion ~nto :our-dimensional geometry. (Note that this is not four-
dimensional ohvsics - the fourth dimension is not time. ) 
• = 
The fo~nsional gearetry analogy 
In The Matherratical Experience, DaVis and Hersh tell us that a four-
dimensional hypercube can be constructed in the following way: 
\In the f~rst step, we take two points, 1 inch apart, and ]Oln 
~hem. We get a line interval, a one-dimensional figure. 
ext, we take two 1-inch line intervals, parallel to each 
other, _ ~nch apart. Connect each pa~r of end-points, and we 
get a 1-inch square, a h,~o-dimensional figure. Next , take two 
1-inch squares, paral_el to each other. Say ~he f~rst square 
~s directly above the second, 1 inch away. Connect 
corresponding corners, and get a 1-inch cube. 
So, to get a 1-inch hypercube, we must take two 1-inch 
cubes, paral_el to each other, 1 inch apart, and connect the 
vertices . Tn ~his mY'l we should get a _-inch hypercube, a 
:ourliL~nsional :~gure' . 
~owever, wi~h each step above we have moved ~n a new direction, each 
direction be~ng perpendicular to al_ of the others. This presents us 
~.nth a problem ~n ~he :~nal step, since we have already exhausted all of 
the directions wi ~h lhich de are fami_iar (as ~hree-dimensional beings 
- DaVis ar~ ?ersh, op.cit., p.400. 
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in three-dimensional space). Nevertheless, we can postulate a new 
direction that is perpendicular to the first three without logical 
inconsistency. And hence, we can conceive of the one-inch hypercube. 
We can even work out the properties that such a hypercube would have. 
For example, we can see that it would have 16 vertices, 32 edges, 24 
square faces, and 8 cubical hyperfaces. In fact, if we define our 
hypercube by means of coordinates, we can work out any relevant question 
by using algebraic methods. 
In an attempt to generate an intuitive understanding of a 
hypercube (rather than the purely fornal understanding facilitated by 
algebraic methods), a rratherratician, Thorras Banchoff, and a computer 
SCientist, Charles Strauss, have rrade computer-generated motion pictures 
of a hypercube moving in and out of three-dimensional space. To help us 
understand just what the pictures show, Davis and Hersh draw the analogy 
of a two-dimensional creature living on the surface of a pond. This 
creature can see objects only on the surface of the pond, not below or 
above it. Thus, the creature can perceive objects only as two-
dimensional cross-sections, which are formed when the objects intersect 
with the creature's two~ensional frame of experience. So, if a cube 
passes from the air into the water, this creature would see a continuous 
series of two-dimensional cross-sections of the cube. Now, returning to 
the Banchoff-Strauss mOvies, what they simulate is what we, as creatures 
limited to a three~ensional frame of experience, would see as a four-
dimensional hypercube passed through our three-dimensional hypersurface. 
What we would see is a continuous series of three-dimensional objects. 
What this series of objects would be is a continuous series of three-
dimensional cross-sections of the hypercube. 
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Now, what we have just seen of four-dimensional geometry I 
think provides a very fruitful analogy in our quest to reconcile our 
metaphysical realist intuitions with the eXistence of different 
incommensurable world-views, each purporting to be correct. The details 
of the analogy are as follows. The four-dimensional hypercube 
represents the unique real world. The three-dimensional creatures 
represent us hurran beings. The three-dimensional hypersurface -- the 
creatures' frame of experience -- represents our linguistic framework. 
Now, our "three-dimensional" linguistic framework intersects the "four-
dimensional" real world. Thus, the world as we know it -- that is, as 
is described wi thin our linguistic framework -- is merely a "three-
dimensional cross-section" of the "four-dimensional" real world. 
To suit our purposes I shall elaborate the four-dimensional 
geometry analogy. But first, in order to make this elaboration easier 
to understand, I shall elaborate the simpler pond analogy. In Davis' 
and Hersh's pond analogy there is just one two-dimensional surface 
through which the cube passes. However, let uS , now suppose that there 
are many different two-dimenSional planes of experience. Furthenmore, 
suppose that mostly these planes are not parallel, and hence intersect 
each other. And finally suppose that the three-dimensional cube does 
not move through these planes, but rather is stationary; but that 
instead each plane intersects the cube. Now, with this analogy in mind, 
let us move to the four-dimensional case. This time there are many 
different three-dimensional hyperplanes or frames of experience. Mostly 
they are not parallel, and hence intersect each other. Each of them 
intersects a stationary four-dimenSional hypercube. 
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Now let us relate this elaborated four~ensional analogy to 
our model of the relationship between language, or knowledge, and the 
real world. As before, the four~ensional hypercube represents the 
unique real world. Each of the three~ensional hyperplanes, or frames 
of experience, represents a linguistic framework: that is, each 
represents the world-view of a corrmunity of "three-dimensional" knowers. 
Each linguistic framework cuts a "three-dimensional cross-section" 
through the "four-dimensional" world. Each such "cross-section" is the 
world-as-described-by-a-particular-linguisti~-framework. Each such 
description is (approxinately) correct. It is fonned. by an ever-
continuing dialectic between the real world and the linguistic 
framework: the real world deteImines how the world is to be described; 
but the way the world is described in turn deteImines how the world 
appears. This is represented in the analogy in the folloWing way: most 
hypersurfaces continually, but subtly, shift their orientations; and 
hence, the cross-sections defined by their intersections with the 
hypercube subtly change. However, these changes in the orientations of 
hypersurfaces and the cross-sections they reveal are not always subtle: 
on rare occasions -- representing cases such as Kuhnian revolutions --
the changes are radical. On the other hand, the orientation of some 
hypersurfaces, and the cross-sections revealed, are very stable 
indeed -- this represents the fact that the linguistic frameworks (and 
hence, world-views) of some remote indigenous tribes, for example, have 
remained virtually unchanged for centuries. 
Now, as we saw in our four-dimensional geometry analogy, the 
different hypersurfaces intersect one another. This represents the fact 
that people from anyone linguistic framework come into contact with 
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other linguistic frameworks. But further, let us assume in the analogy 
that a denizen of a given hypersurface, or frame of experience, can do 
more than merely come into contact with another frame of experience, 
whilst remaining in her own frame: let us assume that given enough time 
she can learn to move into the different hypersurface at will, and thus 
experience a different cross-section of the hypercube. Of course, this 
represents in the actual world a person who becomes so familiar with 
another community's linguistic framework that she becomes able to live 
in it -- that is, she can become part of that community, sharing its 
world-view -- while retaining the ability to re-immerse herself at will 
(after a period of re-adjustment) in her original linguistic framework 
and world-view. For example, suppose that a person who has had a modern 
Western upbringing deliberately has extensive exposure to a tribal 
aboriginal culture, actually living With the aborigines, with the 
express aim of becoming a part of the tribe. She may become quite 
capable of living a tribal lifestyle, even of becoming quite skilled in 
the everyday tribal business -- immersing herself in the aboriginal 
culture. Nevertheless, she can still sometimes return to her Western 
life and, after a period of re-adjustment, function and communicate just 
as she did before immersing herself in the aboriginal culture. Now, in 
the case we have just described, the modern Western world and the 
aboriginal world have in no way been blended or reconciled by the 
person. They remain quite distinct and, indeed, incommensurable worlds: 
in our analogy, the cross-sections of the hypercube are quite distinct 
and different. The person is simply able to "cross over" from one world 
to the other, from one linguistic framework to the other: in our 
analogy, the orientation of the two frames of experience are different, 
but they do intersect one another; and hence, the denizens of one can 
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learn to cross over from one to the other. Thus, in the case as we have 
so far described it, the person cannot sirnUltaneousy be in the two 
worlds, or operate in the two linguistic frameworks. 
Now, some explanation is needed of our case here. It ~ght be 
objected that the two cultures are invariably blended whenever scmeone 
"travels" from one culture to another. And plenty of cases can be put 
forward in defence of this objection: for example, cases of people who 
have been brought up in aboriginal tribes, but who later are thrown into 
the ~dst of modern Western culture. Such people, so the objection 
goes, retain many of their aboriginal beliefs and practices they will 
even speak a mixture of aboriginal and Western languages. Thus, these 
people have in fact blended the two cultures and world-views. However, 
in response to this objection, I would point out that such people fare 
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notoriously badly. They are not accepted either by tribal aboriginal 
culture or by modern Western culture. They actually have no culture, 
and no rraintainable world-view. To me, such cases demonstrate that 
blending two cultures, or world-views, does not work. 
What the person in our example does is quite different. She 
knows that her Western world-view and that of the aboriginal culture are 
incorrmensurable. Thus, she knows that in order to experience the 
aboriginal world-view in as similar a way as possible to the way a 
tribal aborigine does, she must push aside her own Western world-view as 
much as possible whilst learning the aboriginal culture. After in such 
a way becoming totally familiar with the new culture (probably taking 
years), and actively participating in that culture, then eventually I 
think she will start to live in it. That is, she will come to share the 
48 
aborigines' world-view. Now, that is not to say that she will come to 
see the aborigines' world-view as being more correct than the Western 
world-view. Rather, in coming to live within the aboriginal linguistic 
framework, she achieves a leap of faith. When she is actually living 
within the aboriginal linguistic framework, she is effectively ignoring 
the Western-world-view. After achieving such a leap of faith, if she 
discusses, say, the impending expression of wrath of an evil spirit with 
the aborigines, then she may actually fear this evil spirit just as the 
aborigines do. And there will be consequences for her actions of her 
completely accepting the aboriginal world-view. For example, if the 
tribal elder advises that she must drink from a stagnant pond in which 
sacred buffaloes wallow, in order to escape the wrath of this evil 
spirit, then she will do so. Nevertheless, she can at will return to 
live wi thin the Western linguistic framework, with its world-view which 
does not include such evil spirits, and with very different consequences 
for action: for example, no Westerner would choose to drink water from 
such a pond in the knowledge that it would probably contain potentially 
very haDmful bacteria. This move again requires that she make a leap of 
faith, this time pushing aside, or ignoring, the aboriginal linguistic 
framework and world-view. To reiterate, she can only live within one 
linguistic framework, or have one world-view, at a time: in our analogy, 
a being can only be on one cross-section of the hypercube at a time. 
But now let us return to the Strauss-Banchoff computer movies 
of a four-dimensional hypercube passing through our three-dimensional 
space. The purpose of these movies is to try and generate an intuitive 
understanding of a hypercube in three-dimensional watchers. Davis and 
Hersh also describe an interactive graphic system, set up by Strauss to 
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rrake such movies, which has a series of panel controls enabling t he 
operater to move the irrage (the three-dimensional cross-sections of the 
hypercube) at will. Davis and Hersh report that after a period of 
rranipulating the irrage they suddenly did achieve an intuitive 
understanding of the four-dimensional hypercube moving and rotating in 
four-dimensional space. This raises an interesting question for our 
model of the real world and our knowledge of it: could one come to 
acquire an intuitive understanding of the whole "four-dimensional" real 
world - that is, transcend the limitations of one's "three-dimensional" 
linguistic frameworks? The answer to this question will depend on just 
how good an analogy the four-dimensional case is to the real world and 
our knowledge of it. If the analogy is very good~ then the answer would 
probably be affirrrati ve . If one were to become very familiar with a 
sufficiently large number of different world-Views, and were to be able 
to immerse oneself at will in one after another, repeatedly, then one 
might well corne to an intuitive understanding of the "greater" world 
that is, some grand syntheSiS of all of the world-Views constituted by 
the different linguistic frameworks, which somehow transcends those 
limited individual world-views. (Of course, it is quite a different 
question as to whether someone could have the t~e and the intellectual 
capacity actually to perfoDn such a feat; to which the answer is a~ost 
certainly negative. ) 
A cautionary note 
However, we must exercise great caution with such speculation not to 
pursue the analogy further than is justified given the purpose of the 
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analogy. The purpose of the four-dirnensional geometry analogy is to 
illustrate one way in which several incompatible accounts of a single 
object can all be s~ultaneously correct. Our problem was: how do we 
reconcile there being a unique real world with there being any number of 
incompatible, incommensurable, yet purportedly correct accounts of that 
world? One possible answer, given by the analogy, is that there is more 
to the real world -- an extra dimension, as it were (using the word 
loosely here) than can possibly be experienced by any community of 
people, given the limitations of language (and hence of intellect) . 
The point of the analogy should not be taken too literally: we 
are not claiming that the real world is four-dimensional and we are 
three-dimensional. Indeed, we should stress that the weaker cla~ 
arising from the analogy -- namely, that the world is somehow more than 
any or all correct linguistic frameworks can possibly describe -- is put 
forward merely as a possible answer to our problem. There is no -- nor, 
I think, can there be any -- real evidence for such a cla~. It is 
merely ~. possible explanation of the Circumstantial evidence: being that 
there is a unique real world, and a host of purportedly correct, but 
incompatible, accounts of that world. Thus, our move is much like the 
move a defence lawyer might make if the prosecutor is trying to convict 
her client on merely circumstantial evidence. The prosecutor gives a 
plausible account of occurrences, which fits all the available 
Circumstantial evidence and illustrates the defendant's guilt. To 
counter this, the defence lawyer merely needs to give a different, but 
still plausible, account of occurrences, which leaves the defendant not 
guilty. In our case, our four-dimensional analogy pOints to a model 
which accommodates the Circumstantial evidence, and yet which condemns 
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neither the unique independent real world, nor the majority of 
linguistic frameworks purporting to be correct. 
We could have made our point using only the simpler pond 
analogy, or indeed a different analogy altogether. The advantage of the 
four>dimensional geometry analogy is that whereas we have an intuitive 
grasp of three-dimensional space, we do not have such a grasp of a 
fourth spatial dimension. Although all of the dimensions are, strictly 
speaking, mathematical entities only, nevertheless we are introduced to 
three-dimensional geometry when children by reference to our physical 
surroundings -- for example, we are taught that spheres and cubes really 
exist (albeit not quite as perfectly as in geometry). When we come to 
the fourth dimension however, we cannot be shown even an imperfect four-
dimensional solid. The fourth dimension comes across as wholely and 
solely a mathematical construction a hypothetical, though 
mathematically consistent, dimension. This hypothetical but consistent 
character of the fourth dimension is just what we require in our 
analogy; for, as we have seen, all that we have attempted to illustrate 
is a model of the independent real world which explains one possible way 
in which there can be many incommensurable, yet simultaneously correct, 
accounts of that unique world. The model we have presented is merely 
hypothetical, but nevertheless consistent. It successfully illustrates 
that it is possible to accommodate both our metaphysical realist 
intuitions and the conclusions of the relativist's arguments. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PUTNAM'S REJECTION OF METAPHYSICAL REALISM 
At the end of the last chapter we presented an argument to show that it 
is at least consistent to subscribe to the metaphysical realist's model 
of there being a unique independent real world, while at the same time 
accepting the relativist's claim that there are rrany correct 
incommensurable accounts of the world. The model we presented, based on 
the four-dirnensional geometry analogy, exemplifies the thesis that even 
though there is only one independent real world, nevertheless there is 
more than one correct and complete description of that unique world. 
Now, it is easy to see that there can be rrany correct partial 
descriptions of the world: each such description can be perfectly 
consistent with all of the others. But to say that there can be many 
complete correct descriptions, entails that they are incommensurable 
with one another. And this is so in our "four-dimensional" model. In 
the four-dimensional geometry analogy each three-dimensional 
hypersurface completely reveals the hypercube from a particular (three-
dimensional) point of view. Of course, this is not to say that each 
three-dimensional hypersurface reveals the complete hypercube in its 
four dimensions: none of them can possibly do this. However, each 
three-dimensional cross-section of the hypercube is complete in that 
nothing can be added to it to rrake it any more complete. For example, 
such cross-sections cannot be added to each other to make a more 
complete picture of the hypercube. This is because from a thl."ee-
dimensional point of view no two cross-sections can be seen or 
understood as cross-sections of the one object. And so in our model, 
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each linguistic framework correctly and completely describes t he 
"greater" world from a particular point of view. Each such world-view 
is not merely a description of part of the world: it is a description of 
the whole world. 
Spinoza, Ieibniz and. Nagel's bat 
Other philosophers have developed models which also exemplify the thesis 
that there can be many complete and correct descriptions of the one real 
world. Spinoza and Leibniz are two of the most celebrated of them. 
For Spinoza, there is only one substance, which he calls 
'God', or sometimes 'nature'. God is absolutely infinite -- that is, 
God consists of infinite attributes, 'each of which expresses eternal 
and infinite essence/I. His definition of 'attribute' is as follows: 
'An attribute (attributum) I understand to be that which the 
intellect 2 perceives as constituting the essence of a 
substance' . 
The only two attributes that Spinoza identifies are extension and 
thought. If we consider nature under the attribute extension, then we 
comprehend the essence of nature as being extension: that is, what 
nature is is infinite and eternal extension. However, we can also 
consider nature under the attribute thought. Then we comprehend the 
essence of nature as being thought, infinite and eternal. And nature 
1 S . B plnoza, . , Ethics, Transl. A. Boyle, London: J .M. Dent, 1910, Part 
I, Def.6. 
2 Ibid., Part I, Def.4. 
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can be considered under any of its infinity of other attributes (though 
not by finite beings such as ourselves), With its essence consequently 
being comprehended appropriately. 
Now, in Spinoza's scheme, when we say that on the one hand we 
can comprehend the essence of nature as extension, and on the other hand 
as thought, we are not simply comprehending or describing different 
parts of nature. Rather, we are describing or comprehending the whole 
of infinite nature in alternate ways. When we consider nature under the 
attribute extension, then we are correct in comprehending the infinite 
and eternal essence of nature as being extension; if, however, in 
considering nature under that attribute we were to ascribe thought to 
some part of it, then we would be incorrect; despite the fact that when 
nature is considered in an appropriately different way, thought is 
correctly comprehended as its essence. Thus, we can see that Spinoza's 
scheme exemplifies the thesis that there can be many complete and 
correct ways of describing or comprehending the one real world. 
Unlike Spinoza, for Leibniz there are many substances -- for 
example, each of our souls is an individual substance. In Section 9 of 
his Discourse on Metaphysics, he states that 'every individual substance 
expresses the whole universe in its own manner,l . Later in the same 
section he writes that 
'every substance is like an entire world and like a rrdrror of 
God, or indeed of the whole world which it portrays, each one 
in its own fashion; almost as the same city is variously 
represented according to the various situations of him who is 
1 Leibniz, G.W., Discourse on Metaphysics, Transl. G.R. Montgomery, La 
Salle: Open Court, 1902, 1973, Sect.9, p.14. 
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regarding it. Thus the universe is multiplied in some sort as 
many times as there are substances, and the glory of God is 
multiplied in the same wa~ by as many wholly different 
representations of his works' 
Thus, once again we have a scheme which allows that there are many 
wholly different representations or descriptions of the one universe or 
world. And again each representation is a more or less correct 
representation of the whole universe, not merely of a part of it. We 
must say 'more or less' because indiVidual substances, also called 
'Monads', do make errors, and most often possess only confused ideas. 
Each Monad has distinct representations only 'as regards those things 
which are nearest or most in relation to each Monad' 2 . Nevertheless, 
Leibniz holds the folloWing: 
'It is not in the object represented that the Monads are 
limited, but in their modification of their knowledge of the 
object. In a confused way they reach out to infinity or to 
the whole, but are limited ~nd differentiated in the degree of 
their distinct perceptions' . . 
Thus, for Leibniz each Monad is correct in the way it uniquely 
represents the whole universe, but the details of that representation 
are largely incorrect or confused. 
If we conSider our bodies, then we can see a clearer 
illustration of how it is that each Monad has a representation of the 
whole world · completely different from that of each and every other 
Monad. Leibniz writes that 
'all space is filled up; therefore all matter is connected; 
and in a plenum or filled space every movement ·has an effect 
-1 Ibid., Sect.9, p.1S. 
2 Monadology, Sect.60. 
3 Ibid., Sect.60. 
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upon bodies in proportion to their distance, so that not only 
is every body affected by those which are in contact with it, 
and responds in some way to whatever happens to them, but also 
by means of them the body responds to those bodies adjoining 
them, and their intercorrmunication can be continued to any 
distance at will. Cons eque:\t ly , every body responds to all 
that happens in the universe' . 
Thus, since each body is affected by everything in the universe, it 
actually expresses the universe. And hence, the soul, which together 
with such a body constitutes an anirral, can 'read' in its own body a 
representation of the universe. Because the effects exerted on a body 
are proportional to its distance from the event, each body will express 
the universe differently. And since each Monad distinctly represents 
only what is 'nearest or most in relation' to it, each soul will gain a 
special representation of the universe from its own body that is 
different from that gained by each and every other SOUl: 
'Thus although each created Monad represents the whole 
universe, it represents more distinctly the body which 
specially pertains to it And as the body expresses all 
the universe through the interconnection of all matter in the 
plenum, the soul also represents the whole universe in 
reprzsenting this body, which belongs to it in a particular. 
way' . 
Leibniz's account here of how there are different 
representations of the unique real world provides an interesting point 
of contact with the Views of a contemporary philosopher, Thomas Nagel. 
In what is perhaps his best known paper, 'What is it like to be a 
3 bat?' , Nagel argues that we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat. 
We can imagine what it would be like for us to have webbing on our arms, 
1 
2 
3 
Ibid., Sect. 61. 
Ibid., Sect. 62. 
Nagel, T., 'What is it like to be a bat?', in Mortal Questions, 
Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp.165-180. 
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to have very poor vision, but a well-developed high-frequency 
echolocation, and to fly around in the dark catching insects, and so on; 
but this is to imagine what it would be like for us to behave as a bat 
behaves. It is not to imagine what it is like to be a bat -- that is, 
'what it is like for a bat to be a bat,l. Nagel holds that there is 
something unavoidably subjective or internal about the way in which any 
being experiences the world, and that the particular way in which a 
being does experience the world is a function of the kind of physiology 
it has. Thus, the way a being with an alien physiology experiences the 
world is inaccessible to us, even in imagination, since 'Our own 
experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range 
is therefore limited' 2 . The physiology of another being need not be 
very alien for there to be an inaccessible subjective character to how 
it experiences the world. Nagel claims that it can exist between one 
person and another: 
'The subjective character of ·the experience of a person deaf 
and blind from birth is not accessible to me, for example, nor 
presumably is mine to him. This does not prevent us each from 
belieVing fhat the other's experience has such a subjective 
character' . 
It is important to see here that Nagel's point is not the 
hackneyed one that one's experience is essentially private and 
unknowable by anyone else. Nagel's point is that there are facts 
accessible to any given type of being, which are inaccessible to beings 
1 Ibid. , p.169. 
2 Ibid. , p.169. 
3 Ibid. , p.170. 
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of different types. Such facts 'embody a particular point of view,l: 
the point of view of that particular type of being. Of pOints of view 
in general, Nagel says the folloWing: 
'It is often possible to take up a point of view other than 
one's own, so the comprehension of such facts is not limited 
to one's own case. There is a sense in which phenomenological 
facts are perfectly objective: one person can know or say of 
another what the quality of the other's experience is. They 
are subjective, however, in the sense that even this objective 
ascription of experience is possible only for someone 
sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to 
adopt his point of view -- to understand the ascri~tion in the 
first person as well as in the third, so to speak' . 
Thus, we can see that for Nagel there are different ways of experiencing 
or representing or describing the one real world, depending on what type 
of bodily structure the experiencer has. 
It is interesting that Leibniz too held that because bodies 
respond differently to their enVironment, different beings experience 
the unique real world differently, and develop different representations 
of the world -- that is, they have different world-Views. Of course, a 
very important difference between Leibniz's metaphysical scheme and that 
of Nagel is that for Leibniz it is each and every indiVidual being that 
knows facts about the world that are inaccessible to other ordinary 
beings (that is, excepting God). However, for Nagel, as we have seen, 
such particular subjective facts are known by all of the members of a 
type of being. Indeed, there are probably many more fundamental pOints 
of difference between the metaphysical schemes of Spinoza, Leibniz and 
Nagel than there are pOints of similarity . However, I hope that I have 
1 Ibid., p.169. 
2 Ibid., pp.171-172. 
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shown that there is at least one point of similarity between t hem all: 
they all exemplify the thesis that there can be dif ferent 
incorrmensurable, yet nevertheless correct, ways of descri bing the one 
real world. And they have that point in corrmon With our model based on 
the four>dDnensional geometry analogy . 
Nominalism 
In Representing and Intervening1 , Hacking characterizes this thesis and 
calls it 'nominalism'. Nominalism, Hacking argues, is a t hesis 
regarding classification: 
'It says that only our modes of thinking make us sort grass 
from straw, flesh from foliage. The world does not have to be 
sorted. 2that way i it does not come wrapped up in 'natural 
kinds" . 
Nominalism is opposed. to realism, which is the standpoint that the worl d 
comes ready made in particular natural kinds. 
Hacking holds that this issue of classification is to be 
sharply distinguished from the issue of existence. Idealism is a thesi s 
regarding existence: 
'In its extreme form it says th~t all that exists is ment al, a 
production of the human spirit' . 
Of course, once again the opposing standpoint is called 'realism'. 
1 Hacking, I . , 
2 Ibid., p.108. 
3 Ibid., p.108. 
Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University 
Press, 1983. 
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Hacking claims that one reason the same term is used for the opposition 
to both nominalism and idealism is that these two theses 'tend t o be 
part of the same cast of mind' 1 . Yet despite this they are quite 
distinct: 
'The idealist need have no oplnlon about classification. 
He may hold that there is indeed a real distinction between 
grass and straw. He says only that there is no stuff, grass 
and straw; there are only ideas, mental enti ties. But the 
ideas could well have real essences. 
Conversely the nominalist does not deny that there is 
real stuff, existing independent of the mind. He denies only 
that it is naturally and intrinsically sorted in any 
particular way, independent of how we think about it,2. 
Hacking argues that whereas Kant is a transcendental idealist, 
in that he holds that the objects of our empirical knowledge do not 
exist independently of our minds, Putnam is a transcendental nominalist . 
. They are both empirical realists in that they both hold that within the 
world-as-experienced there are real objects, and that statements about 
them are detenninably true or false. But Kant holds that the whole 
world-as-experienced is ideal -- it does not exist independently of the 
minds of the experiencers. Putnam, however, does not hold that t he 
world-as-experienced does not exist; but nor does he hold that it does 
exist in any sense which transcends the mind, or structure of human 
experience. Putnam is not concerned with the question of the 
transcendental existence or otherwise of the world-as-experienced . 
Hacking sums up Putnam's position as follows: 
1 
2 
'Putnam's internal realism comes to this: Within my system of 
thought I refer to various objects, and say things about those 
Ibid., p.108. 
Ibid., p.108. 
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objects, some true, some false. However, I can never get 
outside my system of thought, and rmintain some basis for 
reference which is not part of my own system of classification 
and naming. That is 1precisely empirical realism and 
transcendental nominalism' . 
So Putnam is a transcendental nominalist. 
However, Putnam's nominalism is different in a very important 
way from that of Spinoza, Leibniz and Nagel, and from that exemplified 
by our model based. on the four-dimensional geometry analogy. This 
difference is just that in all of the models except Putnam's, each 
world-as-characterized, or world-as-experienced, does exist in a 
transcendental sense -- that is, each world-as-characterized is a 
correct way of characterizing the real transcendent world. But Putnam's 
rejection of metaphysical realism means that he cannot countenance such 
a position. In Reason, Truth and History2, Putnam goes into more detail 
than in 'Realism and Reason' as to why such a position is incoherent, so 
it will be worth exarnrrning our model in terms of Putnam's arguments in 
the later work. 
Now, although we developed. our model on the basis of the four-
d~ensional geometry analogy, this analogy will no longer be important. 
Remember that the purpose of the analogy was to illustrate one possible 
way in which there could be different world-views, or ways of describing 
the one real world. Since making that pOint, we have seen other 
philosophers who also hold such a position, but not based on such an 
1 Ibid., p.109. 
2 Putnam, H., Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University Press, 
1981. 
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analogy. Henceforth, 'our model' will refer simply to a generalized 
model of many incommensurable world-views, or modes of description, each 
of which correctly describes the unique transcendent real world. How it 
is that each and every different description can be correct in such a 
transcendental sense does not matter: we have seen four different 
accounts of how this is possible, and doubtless there are others. All 
that is important for us now is that it is possible. So this is all 
that our model claims: that there is just one real world, but rrany 
incommensurable correct descriptions or characterizations of it. It is 
this generalized model that we shall examine in the light of Putnam's 
arguments. 
The internalist and externalist perspectives 
Putnam draws a distinction between the internalist perspective and the 
externalist perspective in philosophy. These two perspectives are 
concerned with the question of whose point of view one is adopting when 
one is describing something. The internalist perspective is taken when 
one adopts the point of view of a particular being in the world. The 
externalist perspective is taken when one does not adopt a position 
consistent with any particular being in the world at all, but rather 
adopts a God's Eye, or No Eye, point of view. So, from whose point of 
view are we speaking when we describe our model of the independent real 
world and the many incorrmensurable world-views, each of which is one 
correct way of describing the unique world? Clearly it cannot be from 
the point of view of one of the individual world-views: each such point 
of view reveals only one rranifestation of the independent world. 
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Rather, we must be speaking from an external point of view -- a God's 
Eye point of view. Thus, our model presents an externalist perspective. 
The externalist perspective is the perspective of the 
metaphysical realist. As such, the notion of truth which is integral to 
it has it that truth is radically non-epistemic - that is, that 
whatever is true is so irrespective of whether we know it or not, and 
even of whether we can possibly know it or not. Thus, 
'we might be 'brains in a vat' and so the theory that is 
'ideal' from the point of View of operational utility, inner 
beauty and elegance, 'plau1tbility', simplicity, 
'conservatism', etc., might be false' . 
Now, in Reason, Truth and History Putnam presents what he admits is an 
unusual argument to show that in fact we cannot be brains in a vat. He 
thinks that he thereby undermines the very basis of the externalist 
perspective -- namely, the notion of radically non-epistemic truth 
and hence, shows that the externalist perspecti ve is incoherent. We 
shall now exarrdne his argument. 
Imagine a possible world in which all sentient beings are 
merely brains in a vat of nutrients, which keeps them alive. In this 
possible world, the universe 'just happens to consist of autorratic 
2 
rrachinery tending a vat full of brains and nervous systems' This 
automatic rrachinery happens to be programmed to give all these brains 
and nervous systems a collective hallucination. Putnam elaborates: 
1 
2 
'Thus, when I seem to myself to be talking to you, you seem to 
yourself to be hearing my words. Of course, it is not the 
Putnam, H., 'Realism and Reason', p.125. 
Putnam, H., Reason, Truth and History, p.6. 
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case that my words actually reach your ears -- for you don't 
have any (real) ears, nor do I have any real mouth and tongue . 
Rather, when I produce my words, what happens is that the 
efferent impulses travel from my brain to the computer, which 
both causes me to 'hear' my own voice uttering those words and 
, feel' my tongue moving, etc., and causes you to 'hear' my 
words, ' see' me speaking, etc. 1 In this case, we are, in a 
sense, actually in corrrrrunication' . 
Thus, as far as we could tell, the world would appear no different from 
the way it appears to us in the actual world. 
Now, suppose that the possible world we have just 
characterized were the actual world. That is, suppose that we all 
really were brains in a vat. Of course, the most likely purpose for 
which such a supposition might be put forward is as an argument for 
epistemological scepticism: no matter how perfect our knowledge of the 
world becomes, the brains-in-a-vat possible world means that we can 
never be certain that we have not got the world completely wrong. Thus, 
it is just an alternative to the Dreaming argument for scepticism. 
Putnam's interest in the brains-in-a-vat story is not exactly 
With its sceptical pOint, though I think his interest is related to it. 
What interests Putnam about the story is that he sees it as shedding 
light on the difference between the internalist and externalist 
perspectives in philosophy. In particular, as we have mentioned, he 
sees it as revealing the incoherence of the externalist perspective, by 
way of undermining the notion of radically non-epistemic truth. And 
this is where Putnam's target -- the externalist perspective -- is 
related to the sceptical point of the story. For epistemological 
1 Ibid., pp. 6 -7 . 
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scepticism necessarily presupposes this same notion of non-epi stemic 
truth. Therefore, if he successfully undennines this notion, t hen he 
will have refuted scepticism too, even though he does not expli citly 
claim this. 
Putnam argues that the externalist (or metaphysical reali st ) 
and the internalist (or internal realist) will have different reacti ons 
to the brains-in-a-vat story though he assumes that they both wil l 
wish to refute the story's sceptical conclusion. The internalist, 
Putnam claims, can dismiss the story easily. She will ~ediately ask : 
from whose point of view is the story being told? Obviously, it must be 
from the point of view of someone outside of the vat-world, since none 
of the brains in the vat can know the true state of their world. But, 
Putnam argues, 
'a 'world' by definition includes everything that interacts in 
any way with the things it contains. If you, for example, 
were the one observer who was not a Brain i~Vat, spying on 
the Brains in a Vat, then the world would not be one in which 
all sentient beings were Brains in a Vat. So, the supposition 
that there could be a world in which all sentient beings are 
Brains in a Vat presupposes from the outset a God's Eye view 
of truth, or, more accurately, a No Eye1view of truth -- truth 
as independent of observers altogether' . 
And, of course, the internalist will not countenance a God's Eye, or No 
Eye, perspective. Her whole point is that one necessarily thinks or 
speaks within a particular linguistic framework, or theoretical 
framework, or conceptual scheme; that is, from a particular point of 
view. Hence, the internalist concludes that the brains-in-a-vat story 
is just that -- a story. It does not describe a possible world at all. 
1 Ibid., p. 50 . 
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However, for the externalist it is of no concern whatsoever 
that the brains-in-a-vat story is told from a God's Eye point of View, 
for this is precisely the externalist perspective: that is, the point of 
View which transcends each and every indiVidual point of View. So, for 
the externalist the brains-in-a-vat story does describe a possible 
world. Thus, if she wishes to avoid the sceptical consequences of the 
story, then she must produce a different argument. Putnam thinks he has 
such an argument. 
Supposing that the brains-in-a-vat possible world is the 
actual world, and hence that we are brains in a vat, the crucial 
question Putnam asks is: could we say or think that we are brains in a 
vat? Putnam's answer is that no, we could not say or think such a 
proposi tion. He argues that the supposition that we really are brains 
in a vat 'cannot possibly be true,l, despite the fact that he sees the 
brains-in-a-vat possible world as being genuinely physically possible. 
His point is that if we were brains in a vat, we could not say or think 
that we were so. And therefore, we- cannot even suppose that we are 
brains in a vat. The reason for this, according to Putnam, is that the 
very supposition is self-refuting: 
'If we can consider whether it is ~e or false, then it is 
not true .... Hence it is not true' . 
But how is this so? It is easy to see how this applies to at 
least one other supposition: namely, the supposition that I do not 
1 Ibid., p. 7. 
2 Ibid., p. 8. 
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exist. If I can suppose that I do not exist, then it follows that I do 
exist. However, it is not at all obvious (and Putnam readily admits 
this) that the supposition that we are brains in a vat is self-refuting 
in such a way. The reason Putnam gives for its being self-refuting 
involves reference. Basically, if we successfully refer to vats, t hen 
we cannot be brains in a vat: 
' ... although the people in that possible world [consisting of 
brains in a vat and a controlling computer] can think and say 
any words that we can think and say, they cannot (I claim) 
refer to what we can refer to. In particular, they cannot 
think or say that they ari brains in a vat (even by thinking 
'we are brains in a vat')' . 
Putnam's argument here relies on a particular kind of account 
of reference -- or, perhaps, non-account would be a better description. 
On Putnam's view, a language-user can refer to objects which exist 
according to that user's conceptual sCheme2 . And Putnam does not have 
much more to say about such reference, except to indicate that it i s 
unproblematic. Now, so far as the fODnulation of Putnam's view we have 
just given goes, the externalist can concur With it. For, what is 
essential to the common externalist view of reference too, is that an 
object must exist, and we must be acquainted with it, or recognize it, 
as an existing object, for us to be able to employ a sign to refer to 
it. 
Of course, for the internalist, "Objects' do not exist 
1 Ibid., p. 8. 
2 Ibid. I p. 52. 
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1 independently of conceptual schemes' i whereas, for the externalist they 
do. And thus, Putnam claims, unlike the internalist, ~he externalist 
needs an account to explain how it is that words and sentences within 
her linguistic or conceptual framework refer to things outside of that 
framework, and what the conditions are for such successful reference. 
The commonly accepted account of such reference is the causal account. 
Broadly speaking, for one successfully so to refer, on this account, one 
must have an appropriate causal connexion with that thing: this 
connexion rray be a direct perceptual one i or an indirect one - such as 
Via a book I or Via an expert, etc. Now, Putnam criticizes such accounts 
as accounts of what it is to refer. Thus, he rejects them as 
reductionist: 
'I cannot follow "physicalists" ... who 
that"intentional" or serrantical propert:rs 
reference) can be reduced to physical ones' . 
would 
(for 
argue 
example, 
However, I think that , in demanding an account from the 
externalist of what it is to refer, and then rejecting the suggested 
account, Putnam is not dealing with what is prirrarily at stake between 
the internalist and externalist: namely, what can be known. For, if it 
could be shown by the externalist that the objects we know within our 
conceptual scheme exist independently of our scheme, then reference to 
these objects would be as unproblematic as it is for the internalist on 
Putnam's view. 
1 Ibid., p. 52 . 
2 Putnam, H., 'Three Kinds of Scientific Realism', in The Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol.32, 1982, p.195. 
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Therefore, I think we can settle on a fODnulation of what 
conditions are necessary for successful reference, which both Putnam and 
the externalist can agree on: for one successfully to refer to an 
object, one must be acquainted With it, or recognize it, as an existing 
object. Given this common View, the externalist can agree With Putnam's 
point that 
'the qualitative similarity (amounting, if you like, to 
qualitative identity) between the thoughts of the brains in a 
vat and the thoughts of someone i~ the actual world by no 
means implies sameness of reference' . 
In the brains-in-a-vat possible world, our counterparts have exactly the 
same qualitative experiences and thoughts as we do in the actual world. 
But when they purportedly think and speak about trees, for example, they 
actually do not refer to trees at all: there are no trees (we have 
supposed). But, what about vats? There does exist one vat, and the 
vat-worlders have exactly the same idea of vats as we do. What is 
missing, though, is the vat-worlders' being acquainted with vats as 
existing objects. The fact that the computer gave the vat-worlders an 
idea which is quali tati vely identica~ to that which we who know vats 
have -- and furthermore, to that which they would have if they somehow 
grew bodies and were able directly to perceive the vat in which they had 
been kept -- is purely coincidental (we assume). Thus, given Putnam's 
View of reference, the vat-worlders cannot refer to vats. 
We shall not here go into the maze of argmnents for and 
against such a View of reference: even if we did corne to a conclusion 
eventually, it would not have any relevance to our concerns here. 
1 Ibid., p. 14 . 
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Indeed, I tend to agree with Hacking's view1 that reflections upon 
language never tell us what there is, or what we can know. So, for the 
sake of argument, let us assume that Putnam's view of reference is 
correct, and therefore that the supposition that we are brains in a vat 
is self-refuting. 
Scepticism 
Now, as a prelude to our investigation of whether Putnam's argument does 
indeed show the incoherence of the externalist perspective, let us f irst 
ask this question: does the acceptance of Putnam's argument undermine 
the sceptical point of the brains-in-a-vat story? This is important, 
because if it does not do so -- which I think is the case -- then we 
must conclude (by modus ponens -- see pp.64-65 ) that Putnam has fai l ed 
to undermine the notion of non-epistemic truth. 
Putnam's argument would undermine the sceptical point i f the 
only way to rcake that point was via the supposition that we might 
actually be brains in a vat. The brains-in-a-vat story is a fict ion, 
the purpose of which is merely to illustrate a way i n which a group of 
sentient beings could have exactly the same qualitative experi ence to 
ours and, as a result, an exactly similar account of t he world to ours, 
and yet it actually be the case that its account is entirely mistaken. 
The brains-in-a-vat story describes a possible world; i ndeed, as Putnam 
freely adm1ts, it violates no physical l aw . What Putnam ob ject s to is 
1 Hacking, I., Representing and Intervening, p . 92 . 
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the sceptic concluding from the story that we might in actuality be 
brains in a vat. However, the sceptic might well be able to make her 
point without employing the offending fornrulation, and we shall now 
examine how she might do this. 
Now, Putnam objects to the move from the acceptance of the 
physical possibility of the brains-in-a-vat world, to the conclusion 
that such vat-beings would be mistaken in their world-view. Putnam 
argues that the view of reference to which he subscribes leads him to 
hold that it is not the case that the vat-beings think they 
experience/know about the real world, but in fact do not because the 
computer makes them hallucinate all this experiencing and knowing. 
Rather, Putnam holds that the vat-beings successfully refer to, 
experience and know truths about the world-in-the-image. 
Thus, for Putnam the brains-in-a-vat story merely illustrates 
the fact that beings can have qualitatively identical experiences, 
thoughts and world-view to ours, and yet be referring to completely 
different referents. 
But let us examine Putnam's claims in the light of the story 
again. Remember that we are presupposing the externalist standpoint --
t .hat is, we are describing the vat-world from a God's Eye view. Now, 
Putnam claims that it is incorrect to say that the vat-worlders' world-
view is mistaken. But suppose that the world in the story is very much 
like ours, except having a higher level of technology, and that we have 
constructed the computer which supports and provides all the experience 
to the brains in the vat. And suppose further that after the brains 
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have been in the vat for several years, we rapidly grow bodies f or the 
brains, so that they are suddenly able to experience the real worl d just 
as we do. The crucial question here is this: how do the ex-brains-i n-a-
vat regard their earlier world-view? I think that they would correctly 
regard their earlier world-view as having been an illusion or 
hallucination, and hence incorrect . 
To reiterate, we are presupposing the externalist standpoint 
here: there is just one real world, and hence just one correct 
description of it. Furthennore, 
reference (as fonnulated. on p.69). 
we are assuming Putnam's view of 
Given this, I argue that the ex-
brains-in-a-vat would correctly regard their earlier world-view as 
incorrect, even if it is qualitatively identical with their new, correct 
one. 
Now, Putnam would obje.ct here that their earlier world-view 
was not an incorrect description of what they now know is the real 
world, since it was not a description of the same thing they are now 
referring to. That is, he would reiterate that their earlier world-view 
was a correct description of their actual referent -- namely, the world-
in-the-image. However, I cannot agree with Putnam here. What the 
brains-in-a-vat experienced, and conSidered to be how the unique real 
world actually is, in fact was merely how the independent real world 
appeared to be to them: the image-world was produced by real computers 
in the real world. Thus, the vat-worlders were acquainted wi th the 
independent real world in their experiencing of the (false) appearance 
of that world. And therefore, I would argue that given Putnam's view of 
reference it is true to say that the vat-worlders could refer to t he 
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independent real world, even though they could not possibly know any 
truths about it, except that it appeared to them in such a way. The 
vat-worlders were correct in holding that there is a unique independent 
real world, but their characterization of it was entirely wrong, because 
they did not know that they were actually characterizing a mere image-
world -- an illusion (whether a verisirnilar one or not) produced by the 
real world. Nevertheless, I argue that they were successfully referring 
to, and attempting to characterize, the independent real world. 
Thus, contrary to Putnam, 
brains-in-a-vat story is indeed 
I argue that the force of the 
that beings could well have 
qua Ii tati vely identical experiences and world-view to ours, and yet 
their world-view be entirely mistaken. And since there is no 
qualitative difference between our experiences and thoughts, and those 
of the mistaken beings, then we cannot know that our world-view is not 
entirely mistaken. 
Now, in the latter sceptical fODnulation there is no reference 
to how the world might actually be -- there is no claim that we might 
actually be brains-in-a-vat. Thus, Putnam's argunent will not work 
against it. Furthermore, as well as successfully avoiding Putnam's 
argument, this refor.mulation also preserves the whole of the sceptic 's 
point. Her whole point is that we cannot be certain that our world-view 
is correct; and that no being could ever be certain of its world-view . 
She is just not in the business of saying how the world is: quite the 
contrary, she argues that we cannot know how it is. Thus, the sceptic 
does not put forward the brains-in-a-vat story as a worthwhile candidate 
for acceptance as a world-view. The sceptic nay well accept Putnam's 
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cla~ that the supposition that we are brains in a vat is self-refuting. 
Scepticism is essentially a negative standpoint: it says that we cannot 
know for certain how the world is. Thus, returning to the vat-world 
case, the vat-worlders could themselves have made the sceptical point 
regarding their knowledge of the real world. That is, they could have 
correctly concluded that they could not be certain that their world-view 
was not entirely mistaken -- even though they could not refer to real 
vats. 
But after such a conclusion is reached, the sceptic can then 
become a positive enquirer: although it is futile to demand that we be 
certain that our world-view is correct, nevertheless we can investigate 
the workability of world-Views. OUr realist (broadly speaking) world-
View -- that is, the View that there are real objects around us, which 
we perceive Via our senses -- is quite workable. On the other hand, a 
world-View that we are brains in a vat is totally unworkable, for the 
reason Putnam gives us: that is, that the very supposition is self-
refuting. Nevertheless, this in no way reflects upon the legitimacy of 
the brains-in-a-vat story in the sceptic's argument: it successfully 
shows that our world-View could be entirely wrong. 
Thus, even if we accept Putnam's argument that the supposition 
that we are brains in a vat is self-refuting, we do not therein have any 
good reason to reject the sceptical force of the brains-in-a-vat story. 
No matter how perfect that is, complete and consistent -- an account 
of the world we have, it might be entirely wrong: that is, it might not 
describe how the independent real world is at all. Thus, the notion of 
non-episterrdc truth remains intact, despite our accepting Putnam's 
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argument. 
But it is by undermining this notion, as the foundation of the 
externalist perspective, that Putnam hopes to collapse the whole 
externalist perspective. Has he, then, failed in this endeavour? To 
see, we shall exarrdne how his conclusions about the different 
characteristics of the internalist and externalist perspectives applies 
to our model. 
Our cOl'rbination internalist-externalist roodel 
Recall that our model is of a host of incommensurable linguistic 
frameworks, each of which proVides a correct way of characterizing the 
unique real world. Now, we said that in presenting this model we can 
only be speaking from a God's Eye View, rather than from the particular 
point of View of a particular linguistic framework. Hence, we said that 
the model is externalist. However, that is not the full story. For, in 
constructing the model we said that one can only understand a statement 
from Within the linguistic framework Within which it was rrade. And we 
also said that one can only adjudge a statement as true or false from 
Within the linguistic framework within which it was made. Based upon 
these considerations we would conclude that our model is internalist. 
So then, it seems that our model is in fact both externalist and 
internalist. Does this create a tension in our model? And how does 
Putnam's attack on the externalist perspective affect our model? 
Well first, can we happily have a combination internalist-
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externalist model? Clearly, in such a model we are operating with two 
different notions of truth. On the one hand we have the notion of t ruth 
as being episternic -- this notion being the basis of the internali st 
perspective and the doctrine of internal realism. According to t his 
notion, truth is in essence knowable, at least in principle . This is so 
because a statement made in a particular linguistic framework is true 
just if it states that a certain situation obtains in the world, and 
that si tuation does in fact obtain in the world-as-characterized-by-
that-particular-linguistic-framework. Now, the only way to deteImine 
what obtains in the world-as-characterized-by-a-particular-linguistic-
framework is to examine the relevant data proVided by that linguisti c 
framework, and to reason from that data in the style of reasoning 
supplied by that linguistic framework. Thus, truth boils down to 
whatever is (in the ideal limit) warrantedly assertable, or in other 
words, whatever it is (in the ideal limit) rational to acceptl. 
On the other hand, however, we have the notion of truth as 
being radically non-episternic -- this notion being the basis of the 
externalist perspective, and the doctrine of metaphysical realism. In 
our model, we have supposed that each linguistic framework proVides a 
correct characterization of the independent real world. That is , we 
have supposed that the statements about the world of any particul ar 
linguistic framework, state what is in fact the case in the independent 
real world: that is, they are true. Now, in supposing them to be true 
here, we are operating with the notion of radically non-episternic truth ; 
for no-one can ever know that these statements are true of t he 
1 Putnam, H., Reason, Truth and History, pp.49-50. 
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independent real world, since one necessarily operates Within a 
particular linguistic framework, and hence can come to know as true or 
false only statements about the world-as-characterized-by-one' s-
linguistic-framework. Now, I see no prirra facie tension in our model as 
a result of its having these two different notions of truth, and hence 
being both internalist and externalist. But perhaps consideration of 
Putnam's attack on the externalist perspective Will reveal such a 
tension. 
Simplified" his argument seems to be as follows. For the 
externalist perspective, truth is correspondence With the independent 
real world, and is thus radically non-epistemic. Therefore, the 
externalist must accept that even an ideal account of the world might be 
entirely false, since, for example, we might be brains in a vat. But 
then Putnam argues (and we have accepted his argument here) that a brain 
in a vat cannot refer to vats j . and therefore we cannot coherently 
suppose that we are brains in a vat. Hence, the externalist's notion of 
radically non-epistemic truth appears to be undennined, for we cannot 
even suppose that a situation actually obtains in which we are totally 
mislead as to the state of the world. And so, argues Putnam, we can 
only coherently assume that our account of the world is more or less 
true, and that (in the limiting case) our ideal account of the world 
that is, the account that it is perfectly rational to accept -- must be 
entirely true. Hence, according to Putnam, we are left with the notion 
of epistemic truth as being the only coherent notion. 
Now, I think that when we examine Putnam's argument in the 
light of our combination internalist-externalist model, we can see 
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exactly why he sees the externalist perspective as running into trouble . 
Putnam claims to be considering the brains-in-a-vat story as an 
externalist -- that is, from a God's Eye, or No Eye, point of View. 
From this external point of View we can admit that the story describes a 
possible world. But then Putnam asks us to suppose that we are actually 
brains in a vat; and concludes that we cannot coherently suppose this, 
because if we were actually brains in a vat, then we could not refer to 
vats. Now, there are two ways to take what Putnam is asking us to do. 
If we take it the simpler way, which is the way I think Putnam intends 
us to take it, then indeed it is eVident that we cannot coherently 
suppose that we are brains in a vat. The simpler way to take the 
request 'Let us suppose that we are brains in a vat' is to take it that 
the referents of 'us' and 'we' are identical. That is, the request is 
to be understood as follows: let us suppose that we -- that is, those 
who are now doing the supposing -- are brains in a vat. Now, when it is 
interpreted this way, the request is impossible because the supposition 
is incoherent, for the reasons Putnam gives. But what Putnam fails to 
note is that when we attempt to perfoDn the request, thus interpreted, 
we are thereby moVing from our purportedly externalist starting point to 
the internalist perspective. For we begin by adopting a God's Eye View, 
in describing a possible world in which all sentient beings are brains 
in a vat, but then we proceed to suppose that these very same beings, 
us, who are (playing at being) omniscient gods, are actually operating 
in the vat-world, and hence have limited knowledge as deteImined by 
their world-as-experienced (the vat-world). Now, it is perfectly clear 
that this supposition is incoherent without going into Putnam's 
difficult arguments about reference. What makes it incoherent is that 
in attempting to entertain it in the way in which Putnam does, one slips 
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into the internalist perspective i and Putnam has already conVincingly 
shown us (p.65) that the internalist cannot even admit that the brains-
in-a-vat story describes a possible world. Thus, ipso facto, we cannot 
coherently suppose that we are in such a world. But clearly, when 
Putnam's request is interpreted in this simpler way, it does not tell us 
anything at all about the externalist perspective, despite Putnam's 
claims to the contrary. 
However, the r~est 'Let us suppose that we are brains in a 
vat' can be interpreted in a way wholly consistent with the externalist 
perspective. The key is to be found in Kant's Critique1 , where he 
distinguishes between the transcendental 'I' and the empirical 'I'. In 
our case, the 'us' in the request refers to the transcendental subjects 
who are doing the supposing. In this sense, we are playing at being 
omniscient gods, who are not part of the empirical world at all. The 
referents of 'we' in the above request are different from the referents 
of 'us'. The 'we' refers to the empirical subjects of knowledge, who 
operate only within the world. And it is this sense of 'we' that we 
intend when we simply say 'Suppose we are brains in a vat', or 'We might 
be brains in a vat'. The we that we refer to in such sentences are not 
the God-like consciousnesses who are speaking. Thus, even though we 
accept Putnam's cla~ that any brain in a vat cannot possibly refer to 
vats, and that therefore, if we were brains in a vat, we could not refer 
to vats, nevertheless it is quite coherent for us to suppose that we are 
actually brains in a vat. For the 'us' who do the supposing can refer 
1 Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, Transl. N. Kemp Smith, London and 
Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1929, B155-159, pp.167-169. 
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to vats, because they (we) are supposedly operating from a God's Eye 
point of view. Having supposed that we (empirical beings) are actually 
brains in a vat, we (gods) conclude that we (empirical beings) cannot 
refer to vats, and have a totally incorrect world-view. 
Putnam's mistakenly thinking that he has exposed the 
incoherence of the externalist perspective results from his failing to 
stick to the externalist perspective, and slipping into the internalist 
perspective. More precisely, it is a result of his failing to pursue 
conSistently his own correct characterization of the externalist's 
notion of truth -- that is, as radically non-epistemic truth. Given 
this notion, no one can ever actually know a statement to be true. 
Thus, a genuine externalist Will appreciate as valid the sceptical point 
of the brains-in-a-vat story; she Will not try to dismiss it, as Putnam 
assumes she does. Truth, for the externalist, can only be discovered 
from a God's Eye, or No Eye, point of view. And since on one can ever 
actually have such an external view, then such truth is totally 
inaccessible to everyone~ hence, scepticism. But the total 
inaccessibility, even in principle, of such truth does not mean that the 
notion is incoherent. We can pretend to have a God's Eye view when 
supposing or hypothesizing, as we have done in our model . But we simply 
cannot possibly know anything from such a perspective. 
So, we have seen, contrary to Putnam, that the externalist 
perspective, With its notion of radically non-epistemic truth, is not 
incoherent. But nevertheless, it clearly does not provide us with a 
workable definition of truth. The externalist's, or metaphysical 
realist's, definition of truth -- that is, that a statement is true just 
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if it states what is in fact the case, not just in a world-as-
characterized-by-some-particular-linguistic-framework, but in the 
independent real world -- cannot be employed. It is just not possible 
for anyone, necessarily operating from Wi thin a particular linguistic 
framework, coherently to claim to know that their statements are true in 
this externalist sense. They can only coherently suppose that they are, 
or claim that they might be. The only workable definition of truth is 
provided by the internalist's, or internal realist's, notion of 
epistemic truth: in any given linguistic framework, a statement is true 
just if it states what is in fact the case in the world-as-
characterized-by-that-linguistic-framework. 
Hence, we can clearly see that the externalist assumption in 
our model -- that each different linguistic framework provides a correct 
. 
way of characterizing the independent real world -- serves no purpose 
other than to accommodate our metaphysical realist intuition that there 
is a unique independent real world. In accommodating this intuition we 
merely greatly complicate our model. The model does not thereby become 
better able to account for some bit of evidence or other: there can be 
no evidence or good reason to believe that one's linguistic framework 
correctly characterizes the unique real world, which exists independent 
of one's linguistic framework; for one's linguistic framework determines 
what counts as evidence or good reason for belief. 
Thus, if we hold our combination internalist-externalist 
model, we Will find ourselves in something similar to Kant's position. 
Kant held that all we can know are objects of experience, or 
appearances. Our understanding determines how we are to experience 
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these appearances: that is, it gives particular fOLm to our experience . 
Thus, all mowledge is of the phenomenal world, and this world is 
structured by our intuitions (space and time) and our understanding (the 
categories). However, Kant also posits a noumenal world, or things-in-
themselves, which are the reality behind the appearances we experi ence. 
He holds that we cannot mow anything about noumena. However, he hol ds 
that we are subject to 'a natural and inevitable illusion,l resulting 
from our improperly applying the fOLmS of our understanding to matt ers 
beyond our experience, thereby thinking that we mow about noumena. 
Thus, we can see how Kant's model is similar to ours: we too hold that 
we can at best merely posit a transcendent real world behind our world-
as-experienced, or world-as-characterized-by-our-linguistic-framework. 
We cannot mow anything about this independent real world. 
However, unlike Kant I do not think that our strong 
inclination to hold that we mow. about the independent real world is 
natural and inevitable. FurtheLmore, I will go so far as to questi on 
Kant's view that we can justifiably posit a unique independent r eal 
world. That is, based on what we have seen of the character of the 
externalist perspective and its notion of radically non-epistemic t ruth, 
I hold that there is no good reason for our metaphysical realist 
intuition that there is a unique independent real world. So, perhaps we 
should finally be prepared to reject our metaphysical r ealist 
presupposition of there being a unique real world, independent of all 
particular linguistic frameworks. 
1 Ibid., B354, p.300. 
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But, to return to an earlier objection to rejecting 
metaphys~cal reali~, suppose that all cognitive activity ceased; what 
would remain? Since, after rejecting metaphysical realism, all that we 
allow to eXist are language-characterized worlds, then once cognition 
ceased, nothing would remain. But surely this cannot be true. 
However, our considerations of the internalist versus the 
externalist perspectives provide us With an answer to this objection. 
Consider just what it is that we are being asked to suppose. We are 
being asked to suppose that all cogni ti ve beings cease to eXist --
including us. Now, we have argued above (pp. 77-80) that such a 
supposition presents no problem for the metaphysical realist, who 
operates ftom the externalist perspective. As we argued, the 
externalist perspective allows us to pretend to have a God's Eye View. 
Thus, it allows us (transcendent supposers) to suppose that we 
(empirical knowers) are actually brains in a vat, or even, as in this 
case, that we cease to eXist along With all other knowers. (What we 
could give as answer to the question of what would thus remain would 
still, I argue, be a moot pOint, even given the externalist 
perspective. ) 
However, the internalist perspective does not allow a God's 
Eye point of View. Therefore, after rejecting metaphysical realism, the 
answer to the realist's question of what would remain after all 
cognition ceased, is not nothing. The answer to the metaphysical 
realist's objection is rather to reject the suppostion itself. Given 
that all we are alloWing are language-characterized worlds, the 
supposition of a world totally independent of knowers/speakers cannot be 
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entertained. It could only be entertained if we countenanced at least 
the pretence of a view outside of all empirical observers I pOints of 
view; but, as we have seen, the very notion of such a view is rejected 
as invalid. 
Our roodel minus the independent world 
So, shall we now reject the intuition that there is a unique real world, 
independent of all particular linguistic frameworks? Let us first 
investigate just what kind of model we would be left With if we did 
jettison the language-independent world. The model would simply consist 
of a myriad of inc orrmen surable linguistic-framework-characterized 
worlds. Would such a model be a wholly internalist one, as opposed to 
our original combination internalist-externalist one? Based on one way 
of reading Putnam, he would say yes -- though he might not be entirely 
happy about being so read. When characterizing the internalist 
perspective he writes that 
'it is a characteristic of this view to hold that what objects 
does the world consist of? is a question that it only makes 
sense to ask within a theory or description. Many 
'internalist' philosophers, though not all, hold further that 
there is more than one 'true' theory or description of the 
world'. 
Unfortunately Putnam does not make it clear as to whether he is one of 
those internalist philosophers who hold that there is more than one true 
world-view. But he does at least seem to allow that such philosophers 
are indeed internalists; so it would seem that he would hold that our 
1 Putnam, H., Reason Truth and History, p.49. 
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revised model is wholly internalist. 
But I say that it is not. The key lies, I think, in the 
difference between what rema.ins of our model after the language-
independent world is jettisonned, and what would rema.in of Kant's model 
of what there is if he were to jettison noumena. What would rema.in of 
Kant's model is just the phenomenal world, the world-as-experienced. 
Kant's concern is with human knowledge. He never suggests that human 
beings might have different styles of knowing, similar to Hacking's 
'different styles of reasoning'. There is just knowing, complete with 
its possibilities and limits. Thus, there is but one phenomenal world, 
or world-as-experienced. Clearly then, there is no question of such a 
model being anything but internalist -- there definitely is no God's Eye 
view taken. The point of view we have taken in characterizing this 
Kantian model is that of a being in the world -- that is, in the unique 
world-as-experienced. 
But now consider our revised model of many different 
linguistic frameworks and hence, ma.ny linguistic-framework-
characterized worlds. From whose point of view have we characterized 
this model? It cannot be from the point of view of someone in a 
particular linguistic-framework-characterized world, for the following 
reasons. We have seen that . because linguistic frameworks /world-views 
are incommensurable, to identify the object to which someone refers we 
must be operating within the same linguistic framework as the referrer. 
Thus, if we adopted a particular point of view -- that of a particular 
linguistic framework -- then all we could have is our linguistic 
framework/world-view, and talk of other linguistic frameworks and 
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worlds within our linguistic framework . All we would be referring to 
with such talk are (following Putnam) linguistic-frameworks-in-the-
irrage, and worlds-in-the-image. If we attempted to characterize our 
model from such a particular point of view, then what we would have is a 
model of a linguistic framework/world-view (ours) which includes within 
it other alternative linguistic frameworks/world-views . Now, apart from 
the fact that this is not the model as we intend it, it also 
misrepresents our linguistic framework: our linguistic framework/world-
view does not include alternative world-views, such as the aboriginal 
world-view. Our model, however, is of many alternative linguistic 
frameworks/world-views, each of which is accorded genuine internal 
reality. Our world-view, in this model, is completely on a par with all 
other world-views. And clearly, therefore, even though we purposely 
adopted an internalist perspective in developing the model, with its 
epistemic notion of truth wi thin world-views, nevertheless our 
characterization even of this revised model must be from a God's Eye 
point of view: it can only be presented if we adopt an externalist 
perspective. Hence, even our revised model, with independent real world 
jettisonned, is still externalist, and thereby lands us in the same 
epistemological trouble. 
However, an objection may be raised here, based on the claim 
that our rejection of our revised relativist model hinges on a 
quantifier-shift fallacy. Consider the following argmnent: I cannot 
possibly identify anyone of my beliefs which I believe to be false; 
therefore, I believe that none of my beliefs can possibly be false. 
This argument is invalid. Actually, I believe that some of my beliefs 
are indeed false, even though I cannot possibly identify any particular 
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one of my beliefs which I believe to be false. The invalid move from 
premise to conclusion depends on a quantifier-shift fallacy. Now, it 
may be objected that our argument for the rejection of our revised 
relativist model is of the following fonn: I cannot possible identify 
any alternative world-Views to my own; therefore, I cannot admit the 
possibility of alternative world-Views to my own. But this argument , 
so the objection goes, is invalid for the same reason as the false 
beliefs one is. Just because we cannot identify or know any alternative 
world-Views, it does not follow that they do not exist. Surely we can 
admit at least the possibility of their existing. 
But let us examine the two invalid arguments above. In the 
fonner case, even though ! cannot possibly identify any of my beliefs 
which I believe to be false, nevertheless it is perfectly possible for 
other people to identify particular beliefs of mine which they believe, 
with good reason, to be false. And such people can infonn me of these 
reasons, which may convince me that these particular beliefs are false. 
However, it is a peculiarity of the "intentional" act of believing that 
upon discovering that a particular one of one's beliefs is false, one 
thereby ceases to believe it -- that is, one ceases to have that belief, 
and thenceforth has the contrary belief instead. Thus, even though 
other people can identify particular beliefs of mine that are false, and 
can convince me of their falsity, this cannot be represented as my 
believing that these beliefs of mine are false. But now consider the 
alternative world-views case. What marks the crucial difference between 
this case and the fonner, is that it is not just that I cannot identify 
an alternative world-view to my own, but that even if there were any 
alternative world-Views, no one in such a world-view could identify my 
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world-view as an alternative to theirs either (let alone infonn me of 
the fact). That is, unlike the false beliefs case, what we are talking 
about here are in principle unknowable facts . But we have seen that it 
is an essential tenet of the internalist perspective -- With its 
underlying epistemic notion of truth -- that we cannot countenance 
unknowable truths or unknowable possible worlds . We can construct 
(indeed, we have done) a story of incorrmensurable alternati ve world-
views which are all internally correct; just as Putnam has constructed 
the brains-in-a-vat story. But, as Putnam holds of the latter story, 
our story does not describe a possible world for the internal realist. 
Neither of the stories describe a world which could possibly be known, 
or perceived, or experienced, by anyone in such a world. Thus, the very 
postulation of our relativist model as a possibility presupposes a God's 
Eye view, which the internalist rejects. 
Well then, perhaps Kant , can show us a way out of our trouble? 
We have seen above that Kant's model of the world, minus the Kantian 
baggage of noumena, is wholly internalist, and hence is wholly concerned 
With things that we can know. What if we revised our model in a similar 
way to that in which we revised Kant's, thereby producing a wholly 
internalist model? Would it be acceptable? Such a model would amount 
to identifying language with our linguistic framework. We could not 
recognize the existence of any different real linguistic frameworks, 
because such recognition would necessarily presuppose an (in principle 
unattainable) God's Eye point of view. Thus, it would not even make any 
sense to speak of 01li' linguistic framework -- as if there were others. 
All there would be is language and the world-as-characterized-by-
language. Now, such a model is close to what Donald Davidson holds, and 
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it is to Davidson's philosophy that we shall turn i n the next chapter. 
But first, does our latest model have any prima facie 
acceptability? The most important consideration here is that despite 
our not admatting any genuinely alternative linguisti c frameworks/world-
views, we would still undeniably encounter (translations of ) whole 
bodies of apparently very unusual utterances belonging to (for example) 
other cultures. How would we deal with such utterances? Well, 
presumably we would simply judge that each and every such utterance is 
false or incorrect, since they do not state how things actually are in 
the world -- that is, in the language-characterized world, or the world-
as-known. And we could even grant that groups of such utterances do 
consti tute frameworks, but that these frameworks are incorrect 
nevertheless. 
The debate so far 
But our argmnent has now ironically brought us virtually back to our 
starting pOint. We began from the position that we had the 
(approximately) correct view of the independent real world, and that 
there could be only one correct view of the unique world. But t hen we 
noticed that statements of other cultures, which we initiall y regarded 
as either obviously false or nonsensical, might together constitute 
other Views or perspectives of the world; and that individual 
statements, when adjudged solely with respect to such alternative world-
views, could be correct. Thus, for it to be justifiable to maintain 
that we have the only correct view of the world, we saw that it would 
need to be possible to identify and to characterize the independent real 
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world independently of all linguistic frameworks/world-Views. But this 
was seen not to be possible: one can only characterize the world Within 
some linguistic framework or other. 
of detenmining which world-View 
independent real world. 
Thus, we concluded, there is no way 
is correct With respect to the 
Nevertheless, we wanted to hold on to our metaphysical realist 
intuition that there is an independent real world, and this eventually 
led us to our combination internalist-externalist model. In this model, 
any statement is to be adjudged internally -- that is, Within a 
particular linguistic framework. In addition, each linguistic framework 
is assumed correctly to reveal a mode of being of the independent real 
world; that is, each linguistic framework provides a correct way of 
characterizing the independent real world. Thus, if a statement is 
internally adjudged correct or true, it is assumed on this model that it 
is externally correct or true also. 
But then we argued that there is no good reason, and indeed, 
there can be no good reason whatsoever, for making the assumption that 
each, or even any, linguistic framework correctly reveals the 
independent real world this is because the externalist perspective is 
radically non-epistemic. But since no-one can ever know anything about 
the independent real world, what reason do we have for positing the 
existence of such a world? We argued that there was no good reason. So 
we rejected this world, leaving the model of many different and 
incommensurable worlds-&s-characterized-by-linguistic-frameworks. But 
it was realized that this model still presented an externalist 
perspective: to say that there are many linguistic frameworks, each 
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characterizing a world, and that there can be no choosing between them 
as regards external correctness, since there is no transcendent world 
with respect to which they can be correct, is to adopt a God's Eye, or 
No Eye, point of View -- a View external to each and every particular 
point of View (linguistic framework). Therefore, this model too is of a 
world which we cannot possibly know. 
~, 
Now, finally, we have hit upon a genuinely completely 
internalist model, and hence one which is of nothing but what we can 
know. All there is to this model is language -- that is, our linguistic 
framework and the world-as-characterized-by-Ianguage. This is 
similar to our original position, in that we -- as members of the 
Western scientific culture -- have the only correct view of the unique 
real world. The only difference is that in our latest model the unique 
real world which we alone know correctly is not independent of language. 
Now, many Will be very dubious of the validity of our move 
from the epistemological standpoint that there is no world-View which we 
or anyone else can ever know to be correct with respect to the 
independent real world, to the rejection of the metaphysical standpoint 
that there is an independent real world. We are sure to be charged with 
confusing the two kinds of question: epistemological and metaphysical; 
what we (can) know, and what is. But rather, what we are doing is 
rejecting the whole notion of a metaphysical, as opposed to an 
epistemological, standpoint. It is only profitable to ask, or 
justifiable to say, what there is from a particular point of view. If 
someone could actually have a God's Eye point of View, then that person 
could know the independent real world; and hence, metaphysical realism 
92 
would be perfectly justifiable. But the God's Eye point of view is a 
fiction: there is in fact no such view. We can only pretend that there 
is, but I see such a pretence as being as futile as the absolutist's 
claim that we can still make sense of the concepts of instantaneous 
space and absolute simultaneity, despite accepting the Special Theory of 
Relativity, if we imagine an omniscient observer. Just as the notion of 
such an observer is not tenable given the Special Theory, so the notion 
of a God's Eye view is not acceptable given the internalist perspective, 
according to which all knowers have a particular point of view, or 
linguistic framework/world-view. By pretending that there is a God's 
Eye view, and positing an independent real world, we are gratuitously 
complicating our model. Better to make the model wholly internalist: 
hence, we now move on to Davidson. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DAVIDSON'S IDEA OF A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME 
In the first two chapters we employed the notion of a linguistic 
framework. We said that different linguistic frameworks give rise to 
different world-views, or ways of characterizing the world. Further 
than this, we came to say that different linguistic frameworks 
characterize different worlds -- that is, that pe?ple operating in 
different linguistic frameworks inhabit different worlds. Finally, we 
said that all we can know to eXist is one linguistic framework and one 
world -- namely, the world as characterized by the one linguistic 
framework. Now, the notion of a linguistic framework that we have thus 
employed is the same as that of a conceptual scheme employed by many 
other philosophers. 'Conceptual scheme' is the tenn that Davidson uses 
in 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,l to refer to what we have 
called 'linguistic framework'. We Will use his ter.m for the t~e being. 
In his paper, Davidson argues that the doctrine of conceptual 
relativism is incoherent, from which follows that no sense can be made 
of the very idea of a conceptual scheme. He begins his main argument by 
accepting the doctrine that associates having a language with having a 
conceptual scheme; the supposition being that if conceptual schemes 
differ, so do languages. But then he makes the point that speakers of 
different languages may nevertheless share a conceptual scheme, just if 
1 Davidson, D., 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', in 
Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association, Vol. 50, 1973-74, pp.5-20. 
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their languages can be translated into each other. He therefore revises 
his definition of a conceptual scheme, identifying it With a set of 
intertranslatable languages. 
Now, if the notion of a conceptual scheme is to be at all 
intelligible, there must be at least the possibility of there being more 
than one conceptual scheme. For, to say that the one and only possible 
conceptual scheme is 'the way of organizing experience,l, or 'the system 
of categories that gives fo:rm to the data of sensation,2; or that 
reality is relative to the one and only possible conceptual scheme ; is 
to say nothing more than (respectively) that experience is organized, 
that the data of sensation have fo:rm, and that reality exists. If the 
notion of conceptual scheme does not allow even the possibility of rival 
conceptual schemes, then the notion is empty. 
So, given this point, . and the definition of a conceptual 
scheme as a set of intertranslatable languages, then in order to 
dete:rmine whether the notion of a conceptual scheme is coherent , 
DaVidson need only investigate whether it is possible for there to be 
two people that speak languages which fail of intertranslatabili ty. 
Now, DaVidson identifies two kinds of cases in which languages might 
fail of intertranslatability: namely, complete and partial failure. 
Complete failure would occur if no significant range of sentences in one 
language could be translated into the other. DaVidson spends the bulk 
of his paper arguing for the View that complete failure is 
1 Ibid. I p. 5. 
2 Ibid., p.5 . 
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unintelligible. Partial failure would occur if some range of sentences 
could be translated, and some range could not. After dismissing total 
failure, Davidson briefly examines cases of partial failure, finding 
that they do not ma.ke the notion of a conceptual scheme any more 
intelligible. 
Although Davidson spends most of his paper arguing against 
total untranslatability, we will not be concerned with it here. 
Davidson assumes that some subscribers to the notion of conceptual 
schemes, including Kuhn and Feyerabend, are corrrrdtted to the view that 
different conceptual schemes are totally unintertranslatable. His 
assmnption is based on his interpretation of their tenn 
, inconmensurable' . Davidson dismisses this tenn in the following 
ma.nner: 
, "Incorrmensurable" is, of c'1urse, Kuhn and Feyerabend' sword 
for "not intertranslatable'" . 
However, we have already seen that Kuhn holds that translation is 
possible between conceptual schemes (pp. 28-29); and thus, for him at 
least, 'incorrmensurable' and 'not intertranslatable' are by no means 
synonymous. Certainly, Kuhn does hold that people operating within 
inconmensurable world-views or conceptual schemes are participants in a 
'corrmunication breakdown'; but when we are involved in such a situation 
Kuhn advocates that we 'recognise each other as members of different 
language corrmunities and then become translators,2. I think Davidson's 
misinterpretation of Kuhn's account of the incorrmensurability of 
1 Ibid., p. 12. 
2 Kuhn, T., op.cit., p.202. 
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conceptual schemes may be explained by their having different notions of 
translation (this will emerge later in this chapter). I am not sure 
what Feyerabend is committed to regarding intertranslatability of 
schemes. But, in any case, I think a significant fact that most readers 
of Kuhn and Feyerabend notice is that they are very good at explaining 
what characterizes different conceptual schemes, and showing us in our 
own perfectly intelligible language/conceptual scheme just how different 
conceptual schemes are incommensurable. And this fact shows that 
different conceptual schemes are, at least in one sense, 
intertranslatable to some degree. 
Now, I am not sure whether Davidson successfully shows that it 
is impossible to imagine a language which is totally untranslatable into 
our own. However, I think that if we operate with a common sense notion 
of translation, which is how I see the notion Hacking (pp. 24-25) and 
Kuhn operate with, then any case of a totally untranslatable language 
which might be imaginable would certainly be a science fiction case: for 
example, the language-users would probably have none of our faculties of 
perception, and would corrmunicate to their fellow language-users in a 
way not available to us . Such speculations may well be quite 
entertaining, but in terms of the actual" debate about conceptual schemes 
they are beSide the pOint. As Hacking comments, 
'As a matter of brute fact fll human languages are fairly 
easily partially translatable' . 
The most that subscribers to conceptual schemes hold -- though I am not 
saying that they necessarily hold even this much -- is that there is 
1 Hacking I., 'Language, Truth and Reason', in M. Hollis and S. Lukes 
(eds.), op.cit., p.61. 
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some failure of translation between conceptual schemes. So, what does 
Davidson have to say about partial failure of intertranslatabili ty? 
Davidson's argument against conceptual schemes 
He begins with the following two prerrdses: 'a man's speech cannot be 
interpreted without )mowing a good deal about what he believes (and 
intends and wants) ,1; and 'fine distinctions between beliefs are 
2 impossible without understood speech' . From these Davidson infers that 
any theory either of how we interpret speech, or of how we account for 
beliefs and attitudes, cannot presuppose the other as fact: what we 
require is a theory that simultaneously- interprets speech and accounts 
for attitudes, and depends on no evidence which assumes either. 
Davidson holds that the, way to achieve this is first of all to 
assume that any speaker, no matter what the language, accepts as true 
any sentence he/she utters. Davidson argues that this assmrrption 
clearly does not violate the above conditions, since despite making it 
we are none the wiser as regards what his/her sentence means, nor as 
regards what belief his/her holding it true represents. So, 'the 
problem of interpretation', according to DaVidson, 'is to abstract from 
the evidence a workable theory of meaning and an acceptable theory of 
belief,3. 
1 Davidson, op. ci t., p. 1 7 . 
2 Ibid., p. 1 7 . 
3 Ibid., p.lS. 
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Davidson gives us an example of how this works in practice. 
Suppose you and a companion see a yacht. Your companion says, 'Look at 
that handsome yawl', but you can see clearly by the position of the 
jigger that it is in fact a ketch. Davidson explains that there are two 
possible reactions. The first is that your companion has simply 
mistaken a ketch for a yawl: that is, he has acquired a false belief . 
However, supposing you know your companion to have adequate vision, and 
that he has a clear and unobstructed view of the yacht, .you may well opt 
for the second possibility and judge that he means something slightly 
different by 'yawl' than you do. We have thus reinterpreted an 
utterance in order to preserve a reasonable theory of belief. 
Now, Davidson admits that this case is relatively trivial, 
since there exists a background of corrmon beliefs and a method of 
interpretation. However, Davidson claims that the same principles apply 
even to cases of radical translation -- that is, interpretation of a 
totally foreign language from scratch. What is crucial in such cases, 
according to Davidson, is the point that 
'if all we know is what sentences a speaker holds true, and we 
cannot assume that his language is our own, then we cannot 
take even a first step towards interpretation without knowing 
or assuming a great deal about the speaker's beliefs' . 
But, as we know from the original premises, knowledge of beliefs comes 
only with interpretation of speech, which, of course, we do not yet 
have. So Davidson concludes that the only possible way to begin and 
carry on the process of interpretation is to apply the so-called 
principle of charity -- the principle that we must count people right in 
1 Ibid., p. 18 . 
99 
most matters. That is, we assume general agreement on beliefs with the 
person whose speech we wish to interpret. This principle allows us to 
establish 'a systematic correlation of sentences held true with 
sentences held true,l. The wider this 'foundation in agreement' 2 , 
according to Davidson, the more sense we make out of the speech and 
thought of others. 
Davidson believes that this account of interpretation removes 
any bite from the idea of a conceptual scheme, and certainly totally 
undermines conceptual relativism. He writes the folloWing: 
'If we choose to translate some alien sentence rejected by its 
speakers by a sentence to which we are strongly attached on a 
community basis, we may be tempted to call this a difference 
in schemes; if we decide to accommodate the evidence in other 
ways, iSmay be more natural to speak of a difference of 
opinion' . 
Now, I take it that by 'strongly attached on a community basis' Davidson 
means that the sentence is held to be a basic truth, so much so that 
anyone who is a member of the language community will have that belief. 
Let us take as an example our aborigine case from Chapter 1. 
(For convenience alone we shall reverse Davidson's polarity of truth 
values. ) Suppose once again that an aborigine pOints to an ancient 
hlm'an bone and utters a sentence which we translate as 'This bone has 
supernatural powers'. Recall, however, that the aborigine's concept is 
essentially bound up with how her culture reasons about such powers 
1 Ibid. I p.19. 
2 Ibid. , p.19. 
3 Ibid. , p.19. 
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(pp.25-28). Such reasoning is totally foreign to our culture, and hence 
her concept is not the same as our concept super-natural. OUr 
translation of her concept as 'supernatural' reflects our interpretation 
or judgement of her concept. Suppose again that she strongly holds the 
statement to be true, and that such beliefs in "supernatural" powers 
inhering in objects in her environment are basic to her culture. We, 
however, as speakers in a scientific language community, certainly would 
not accept her statement as true. But this is not to say that we would 
simply reject it as false. Rather, I think we would reject the 
sentence, and the example of reasoning of which it is a part, as perhaps 
bizarre or absurd. Perhaps if we were pushed by an enquirer to say 
whether we held the aborigine's proposition true or false, then we might 
reject it as false; but this ignores the fact that such propositions are 
part of a style of reasoning which is not shared by us; and that hence 
such propositions are not issues, or candidates for truth-or-falsehood, 
for our scientific language community. 
Now, surely the aboriginal case we have just described is one 
in which, using Davidson's words, 'we rray be tempted to call this a 
difference in schemes'. However, according to Davidson, it is open to 
us to 'decide to accommodate the evidence in other ways', in which case 
'it rray be more natural to speak of a difference of opinion'. So, for 
example, instead of translating the aborigine's utterance as 'This bone 
has supernatural powers', we might choose to translate it as 'This bone 
is very rare and strong'. However, let us assume further that we 
believe the bone to be exactly like the rrany fragile old bones to be 
found in the area: that is, we hold that the bone is neither rare nor 
strong. Now, it is easy to irragine a context which might incline one 
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translator to translate the utterance as the fonner statement, while 
inclining another to translate it as the latter: for example, the 
context of the bone's being used in a particular ritual. The first 
translator might see the ritual as the aborigines' attempt to manipulate 
their environment by invoking "supernatural" powers in the bone. 
However, the second translator might see the ritual as being merely an 
expressive activity, like a play in our culture; and thus, the reason 
for the bone's revered place in the ritual is that it is seen as a key 
symbol in the theme of the ritual -- say, the overwhelming strength of 
nature. To opt for the former interpretation will incline us to see a 
difference in conceptual schemes, each with its own style of reasoning, 
creating different possibilities or candidates for truth-or-falsehood. 
To opt for the latter will incline us to perceive a mere difference in 
opinion -- that is, one culture believing a particular proposition to be 
true, and the other culture believing the same proposition to be false. 
Thus, Davidson argues that 
'when others think differently from us, no general principle, 
or appeal to evidence, can force us to deCide th~ the 
difference lies in our beliefs rather than our concepts' . 
He goes on to say the following: 
'Given the underlying methodology of interpretation, we could 
not be in a position to judge that ot~rs had concepts or 
beliefs radically different from our own' . 
Thus, on Davidson's account of interpretation there can never be a 
definitive case of partial failure of intertranslatability an 
alternative interpretation is always possible. And therefore, we can 
never discover a definitive case of an alternative conceptual scheme. 
1 Ibid., pp.19-20. 
2 Ibid., p. 20 . 
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Hence, we cannot possibly find any support for conceptual re l ativism; 
and therefore, the very idea of a conceptual scheme is meaningl ess, 
according to Davidson. 
OUr wholly internalist m:rlel 
Now, recall the wholly internalist model that we arrived at towards the 
end of the last chapter. All there is to this model is language and the 
world-as-characterized-by-Ianguage. Given this model, we saw that there 
is no sense talking of our linguistic framework, for by rejecting the 
externalist perspective we preclude our recognizing the existence of any 
others. Truth, in such a model, consists in a statement's stating what 
is in fact the case in the world-as-characterized-by-Ianguage: it is not 
correspondence with a language-independent world. This position is 
clearly very close to Davidson's. He concludes his 'On the Very Idea of 
a Conceptual Scheme' with the following: 
, Given the dogrra of a duali sm of scheme and reality, we get 
conceptual relativity, and truth relative to a scheme . 
Without the dogrra, this kind of relativity goes by the board . 
Of course truth of sentences remains relative to language, but 
that is as objective as can be. In giving up the dualism of 
scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but reestablish 
unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make 
our sentences and opinions true or false' . 
Similarly, in our model we reject the dualism of framework and t he r eal 
world. And similarly, truth on our model is relative to language, which 
has unmediated contact with the real world -- that is, the worl d- as-
characterized-by-Ianguage. And finally, it is the world which makes 
1 Ibid., p. 20. 
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statements true or false on our model too. 
We should note here that the formulation we have given of what 
truth consists in for the internal realist -- namely, that a statement 
is true just if it states what is in fact the case in the world-as-
characterized-by-language -- is not a fODmulation acceptable to Putnam. 
The major a~ of Reason, Truth and History is to show that we should 
reject what Putnam calls 'the copy theory of truth' , 
'the conception according to which a statement is t:ye just in 
case it 'corresponds to the rrdnd-independent facts" . 
The view that he holds instead is 
'that there is an extremely close connection between the 
notions of truth and rationalitYi that is, to put it even more 
crudely, the only ~iterion for what is a fact is what it is 
rational to accept' . 
However, he nevertheless holds that it is not identical to rational 
acceptability: 
'But the relation between rational acceptability and truth is 
a relation between two distinct notions. Aftatement can be 
rationally acceptable at a t~e but not true' . 
Later it turns out that truth for Putnam's internalist is 'an 
idealization of rational acceptability,4 i that is, a statement is true 
just if it 'would be justified' under 'epistemologically ideal 
conditions'S. Now, our fODmulation of what truth is for the internalist 
bOils down to correspondence to the world-as-characterized-by-language. 
1 Putnam, H., Reason, Truth and History, p.20. 
2 Ibid. , Preface, p.ix. 
3 Ibid. , -Preface, p.x. 
4 Ibid. , p.57. 
5 Ibid. , p.57. 
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As we have just seen, Putnam does not countenance such a formulation, 
since his prime target is the correspondence theory of truth. He sees 
his internalist theory of truth as being a coherence theory, in which 
truth is 
'some sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other 
and with our experiences as thosf experiences are the~elves 
represented in our belief system' . 
However, obViously our fODnulation of what truth is for the 
internal realist is not a correspondence theory of truth in the normal 
sense -- that is, in the metaphysical realist sense -- where truth is 
correspondence with the rrdnd-independent language-independent world. 
Indeed, it is open to us consistently to admit that what correspondence 
to the world-as-characterized-by-language bOils down to is idealized 
rational acceptability, or coherence of our beliefs with each other and 
with our experiences. But, in formulating the internal realist's notion 
of truth in the way he does, Putnam leaves it far from clear as to what 
is the force of his narrdng the doctrine 'internal realism'. For, as we 
have seen, his fODnulation finnly places the internalist' s notion of 
truth in the category of coherence theories of truth. And 
traditionally, coherence theories of truth have been identified as anti-
realist theories, as opposed to the correspondence theory, which has 
been identified as realist. Thus, I see the advantage of our 
for.mulation as being that it captures the realist flavour of internal 
realism, but without being the kind of correspondence theory of truth 
which Putnam correct+y rejects. What makes internal realism, as we have 
characterized it, a realist doctrine is that it (quoting DaVidson again) 
1 Ibid., p. 50 . 
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'reestablish[es] unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics 
make our opinions true or false'. With metaphysical reali~, as we have 
seen, there is no unmediated contact with the familiar real world, 
because of that doctrine's essential connection with epistemological 
scepticism. 
Davidson's argument criticized 
Now, returning to Davidson's paper, we have seen how the wholly 
internalist model we arrived at towards the end of the last chapter is 
very similar to Davidson's position. And we have seen Davidson's 
argument for his claim that the idea of there being even a partial 
failure of intertranslatabili ty between languages is untenable, and 
hence, that the idea of there being different conceptual schemes is also 
untenable. His argument is based on his account of translation, with 
its principle of charity. There is a crucial element of choice in his 
account. There is always a choice as how the sentences of another 
language are translated into our language. But, given this essential 
element of choice, and given the principle of charity, I cannot see how, 
on Davidson's account of translation, we should ever arrive at statement 
like 'This bone has "supernatural" powers' as a translation of a foreign 
speaker's sentence. (The shudder quotes here indicate that the 
translated word 'supernatural' is understood in the context of how the 
concept is employed in aboriginal reasoning -- thus, it is understood by 
the translator not to be the same as our concept super-natural. ) There 
are two reasons why this should never · happen. The first is that we 
should never let it happen. Given the desirability of optimizing 
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agreement (the principle of charity), why would we not opt for a 
systematic translation of a language which only ever implies mere 
differences of opinion, rather than the more drastic difference of 
conceptual scheme? We have seen above how an alternative translation 
could be arrived at in preference to 'This bone has "supernatural" 
powers'. The alternative -- namely, 'This bone is very rare and 
strong' -- represents merely a difference of opinion, since we are of 
the opinion that the bone is common and fragile. However, the former 
translation introduces a new concept -- that of "supernatural" power as 
possessed. by particular objects and thus it represents the more 
drastic, and far less charitable, difference of conceptual scheme. Now, 
why could we not develop a systematic translation of any given foreign 
language which would render such a "more charitable" translation of each 
and every sentence of that language? (Certainly, this task would be 
extremely difficult, but perhaps possible With the aid of computers.) 
Given DaVidson's cla~ that there is always a choice as to how 
to translate a foreign sentence -- ' that no . 'appeal to eVidence' can 
'force us to decide' how to translate it then surely he should be 
comrrdtted to a radical retranslating of all foreign languages, producing 
translations which represent differences solely of opinion, and never 
differences of conceptual scheme. It seems to me that for DaVidson to 
accept any of the current translations of foreign languages -- With 
their implications of differences of conceptual scheme -- he would 
thereby be accepting a counterexample which would refute his account of 
translation and his principle of charity. For it is "more charitable" 
never to imply a difference of conceptual scheme. 
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Now, I see nothing intrinsically wrong with advocating such a 
drastic retranslating of all foreign languages, so that all of the 
statements thus translated operate only with concepts which are already 
employed in our own language. And I think that in order for his views 
to be consistent Davidson should advocate such retranslation. Hence, so 
far there is no serious problem for Davidson's account. But now we come 
to the second reason why we should never arrive at a statement like 
'This bone has "supernatural" powers' -- that is, a statement which 
indicates a difference of conceptual scheme as a translation of a 
foreign sentence, given Davidson's account of translation. I think that 
this second reason, unlike the first, is problematic for Davidson 's 
account. We have just seen that given the principle of charity we 
should translate a foreign language so that the translated statements 
display at worst differences of opinion, rather than a difference of 
conceptual scheme. In other words, any statement in translation should 
only employ concepts as they are already in use in our own language . 
But what I would now ask Davidson is how could it turn out that a 
statement in translation employed anything but concepts as they are 
already in use in our own language? For Davidson, translation is a 
matter of correlating sentences in the foreign language with sentences 
in our own language. Therefore, the concepts as expressed in the 
sentences so correlated must be employed in our language prior to this 
correlating. Thus , given Davidson's account of translation, I cannot 
see how we could possibly arrive at a translation of a foreign sentence 
which translation employed an unfamiliar concept. 
Thus, I cannot see how, on such a view, a scientific language-
corrmuni ty such as our own could possibly arrive at a statement like 
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'This bone has "supernatural" powers' as a translation of a foreign 
sentence. The aborigines' concept of "supernatural" power as possessed 
by particular objects is not one with which our Western scientific 
language is familiar -- we have no ways of reasoning employing such a 
concept. As we have seen, the situation cannot be represented as a mere 
difference of opinion. It is not simply the case that the aborigines 
hold that this bone has super-natural powers, and we hold that it does 
not. The aborigines' question of whether a particular object has 
"supernatural" powers is not an issue in our language. To use Hacking's 
terminology again, the statement that the bone has "supernatural" powers 
is not either-true-or-false in our language -- that is, it is not even a 
candidate for a truth-value. Thus, neither the sentence 'This bone has 
"supernatural" powers' nor the sentence 'This bone does not have 
"supernatural" powers' is up for consideration as a useful unit of 
communication in our language. 
However, the fact is that we do arrive at statements such as 
'This bone has "supernatural" powers' as translations of foreign 
sentences. Such translations, which I claim employ concepts which are 
new to us, are counterexamples to DaVidson's account of translation. 
And hence, I argue that the conclusions he draws from his account, 
involVing the incoherence of the idea of a conceptual scheme, are 
refuted. 
Now, Davidson might well argue in response to our suggested 
counterexample that we have begged the questio~ of conceptual schemes in 
translating the sentence as 'This bone has "supernatural" powers', 
rather than simply 'This bone has supernatural powers'. That is, our 
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qualified translation does not square with Davidson's notion of 
translation as simply the correlating of the sentences of the foreign 
language with sentences in our language. However, I think that our 
example would be quite typical of the kind of sentences that real 
translators would come up with in their translations of languages like 
the aboriginal one. That is, searching for a translation, they would 
consider the foreign sentences and their parts in the context of how 
they fit into examples of reasoning, in an attempt to understand the 
concepts as they are used. Now, often it might be that to translate 
just one sentence of the foreign language adequately would take rrany 
sentences in our language. So, to rrake a useful translation, 
translators would be forced to employ (sometimes gross) approximations 
in correlating sentences and parts of sentences, qualified with 
explanations of how differently the correlated words and sentences, and 
the concepts they express, fit into the respective cultures' styles of 
reasoning. 
I think that there are even more clear-cut cases of totally 
unfamiliar concepts being expressed in our translations of foreign 
languages. They are, however, much rarer than the corrmon cases 
exemplified by our "supernatural" bone case. Such cases are indicated 
by expressions in our language which are actually taken directly from 
foreign languages, because our language had nothing even approaching the 
concepts employed in these languages. I am thinking here of the terms 
'nirvana I, taken from Buddhist doctrine, 
Tongan language. These cases provide 
and ' tabu', taken from the 
further counterexamples to 
Davidson's account of translation, and his rejection of the notion of 
conceptual schemes. 
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In his philosophy of language, Davidson is very wary of the 
notion of meanings as entities. Translation, however, is perfectly 
straightforward to h~: a definitive translation system is provided for 
a foreign language as soon as one develops a (Taskian) theory of truth 
1 for that language. The notion of meaning is not employed in Davidson's 
account of translation. But this is where Davidson's notion of 
translation differs from what I have called 'the common sense notion'. 
I think that the common sense notion is the one that real translators 
operate with. According to this notion, translation proceeds by first 
learning what particular linguistic expressions mean, as they are used 
in a culture. This involves a thorough investigation of the linguistic 
and non-linguistic contexts in which the expressions are used. (The 
-importance to a translator of both descriptive linguistics and 
ethnology, in the discovery of the meanings of the expressions of a 
foreign culture, is very well illustrated by Eugene Nida in his 
'~nguistics and Ethnology in Translation-problems,2.) After thus 
discovering the meaning of the expressions, the translator can then 
attempt to express the same meanings in our language. However, as we 
have said, often our culture will not employ the same concepts as the 
foreign culture, and hence our language will not have convenient 
expressions for those concepts. The translator then has the options' of 
using an eXisting expression for a concept of ours which is somehow 
related to the foreign concept, with a careful explanation of how our 
1 Davidson, D., 'In Defense of Convention T', in H. Leblanc (ed. ) I 
Truth, Syntax and Modality, P-IDSterdam and London: 
North Holland, 1973, pp.76-86. 
2 Nida, E., '~nguistics and Ethnology in Translation-Problems', in D. 
Hymes (ed.), Language in Culture and Society, New York: 
Harper and Row, 1964, pp.90-100. 
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concept differs from the foreign one i or alternatively, using the 
foreign expression itself, with an explanation of its meaning. 
Now, the notions of meaning, concept, and style of reasoning 
are far from unproblematic -- criteria of individuation and identity for 
each of these notions are unclear. And hence, criteria for adequacy of 
translation, given the common sense notion, are also not clear-cut, and 
translations are never defini ti ve . On Davidson's account of 
translation, however, as we have mentioned, a theory of truth for a 
language does provide a definitive translation of that language. 
Nevertheless, I hold that there is a definitive meaning expressed by the 
aborigine's statement. And this meaning is what translators try to 
discover in investigating the foreign culture and its language. Now, 
although there may be no definitive translation available, such 
translators are at least searching for the best way of expressing the 
aborigine's actual meaning. And I think that it can be clearly 
established by translators employing this method that certain 
translations are categorically incorrect, even if they are provided by 
acceptable theories of truth. For example, a Davidsonian translator 
might develop a theory of truth for the aboriginal language which 
detenmines that sentence s of L (the aboriginal language) is true just 
if this bone has supernatural powers. But we have seen that the 
aborigine is not saying that this bone has supernatural powers. The 
Davidsonian translator's translation does not convey the same meaning as 
the aborigine's statement. To convey her meaning, we have to do quite a 
bit of explaining about her culture's style of reasoning, and how her 
statement fits into it. After we have done this we may perhaps risk 
using the word 'supernatural' to express her concept (though enclosing 
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the word in shudder quotes might be safer), in the hope that readers 
will understand its special meaning when used as a translation of the 
aborigines' expression. 
Because I accept the corrmon sense account of translation --
along with Kuhn, Hacking, and I presume most people, including most real 
translators -- rather than Davidson's account, I consider his whole 
emphasis upon translation, in dealing with the idea of a conceptual 
scheme and conceptual relativism, to be wrong-headed. Once Davidson, at 
the very beginning of his argument, defines a conceptual scheme as a set 
of intertranslatable languages, he misses (albeit deliberately) the 
point of conceptual schemes and conceptual relativism -- no wonder he 
finds the very idea of a conceptual scheme to be incoherent. Different 
conceptual schemes are incorrmensurable, rather than unintertranslatable . 
In this chapter we have found Davidson's account of 
translation, and his way of dealing with the idea of a conceptual scheme 
and conceptual relativism, to be unsatisfacto~. However, if we are to 
reject justifiably Davidson's dismissal of the idea of a conceptual 
scheme, then we must provide a satisfactory account of conceptual 
schemes. And, in thus doing more justice to the issue than Davidson, we 
must also deal with the Putnamian problems which led us at the end of 
Chapter 2 to our wholly interpalist/Davidson-like model. Hence, it is 
with the a~ of providing an adequate account of conceptual schemes, or 
world-views, and relativism, that we now tum to Rudolf Camap's 
discussion of linguistic frameworks. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CARNAP'S LINGUISTIC FRAMEWORKS 
In 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology' carnap is concerned with the 
problem of what ontological status is to be accorded to abstract 
entities. He asks the question: 
'Are there properties, classes, numbers, propositionS?,l. 
In order to understand this problem more clearly Carnap draws what he 
considers to be a fundamental distinction between two kinds of questions 
concerning the ontological status or reality of entities. This 
distinction relates to the linguistic framework in which the particular 
kind of entities in question are talked about. First, there are the 
questions asked within the linguistic framework as to whether the 
particular entities of the relevant kind eXist. Such questions Carnap 
calls 'internal questions'. Secondly, there are questions of the 
eXistence or reality of the relevant system of entities as a whole. 
Carnap calls these 'external questions'. The answers to internal 
questions are discovered by either logical or empirical means. External 
questions, however, are problematic. 
In order to clarify this fundamental distinction we shall 
first conSider with Carnap the simplest kind of entities dealt with in 
our everyday language: 'the spatio-temporally ordered system of 
1 Carnap, R., op. cit., p.206 .. 
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observable things and 1 events' . Once we have accepted the thing 
linguistic framework we can ask and answer internal questions. Carnap 
gives the following as examples of such questions: ' Is there a white 
piece of paper on my desk?'; 'Did King Arthur actually live?'; and 'Are 
unicorns and centaurs real or merely imaginary?'. The answers to such 
questions are to be found by empirical investigation. The thing 
linguistic framework, like other linguistic frameworks, comes complete 
with rules for confirming or disconfirming evidence for possible 
answers; though Carnap pOints out that people actually operating in a 
linguistic framework will usually operate out of habit rather than 
deliberately according to a rational procedure. Carnap argues that the 
concept of reality presupposed in these internal questions in the thing 
linguistic framework is an empirical, scientific, non-metaphysical one. 
He writes: 
'To recognize some thing as a real thing or event means to 
succeed in incorporating it into the system of things at a 
particular space-time position so that it fits together with 
other thin~s recognized as real, according to the rules of the 
framework' . 
Now we come to the very difficult external question concerning 
the reality of the system of things and events as a whole. Carnap 
argues that this question is raised neither in everyday language nor by 
scientists. It is only raised by philosophers, and notoriously the 
problem is never solved. Now, Carnap holds that the reason that it is 
never solved is that the question is incorrectly framed. It is framed 
as if it were a scientific or theoretical question. But, as Carnap 
1 Ibid., p. 206. 
2 Ibid., p. 207. 
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argues: 
'To be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of 
the system; hence th~ concept cannot be meaningfully applied 
to the system itself' . 
He goes on to say that those who pose the question of the reality of the 
thing world as a whole are perhaps asking a practical question about the 
structure of language, rather than the nonsensical theoretical one as 
formulated. Thus, the only meaningful external question is whether or 
not we should accept and use the linguistic framework in question. 
Now, Carnap recognizes that in the case in point -- the thing 
linguistic framework -- we do not deliberately choose to accept the 
framework. As he pOints out, we rather learn to use it as a matter of 
course. However, he continues as follows: 
'Nevertheless, we may regard it as a matter of decision in 
this sense: we are free to choose to continue using the thing 
language or not; in the latter case we could restrict 
ourselves to a language of sense data and other "phenomenal" 
entities, or construct an alternative to the customary thing 
language With 2nother structure, or, finally, we could refrain 
from speaking' . 
Thus, although initially we do not so much choose to accept the thing 
linguistic framework as "grow up with it", nevertheless we can still ask 
the external practical question about the linguistic framework as a 
whole: that is, should we continue to use this thing language? 
But now we come to a crucial point in Camap' s account. 
Suppose that we answer the above question in the affirmative -- that is, 
suppose that we deCide to accept the thing linguistic framework . Now, 
1 Ibid., p. 207. 
2 Ibid., p. 207. 
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carnap states that he has no objection to our saying that we have 
accepted the world of things. But Carnap argues that this must not be 
taken to mean that we have accepted a belief in the reality of the world 
of things. This is because the question of whether to accept or to 
reject a given linguistic framework is not a cognitive or theoretical 
question, and therefore there is no such belief or assertion or 
assumption. Carnap states: 
'To accept the thing world means nothing more than to accept a 
certain fODn of language, in other words, to accept rules for 
fODniJ:g statements and for testing, accepting, or re jecting 
them' . 
Of course, as Carnap continues, once we accept the thing linguistic 
framework we are led, on the basis of empirical observation, to the 
belief and assertion of certain statements as to the reality of certain 
things: for example, that there is a white piece of paper on my desk, 
and that unicorns and centaurs are merely imaginary. However, a 
statement as to the reality of the thing world cannot be among these 
statements because it cannot be fODnulated in the thing linguistic 
framework. 
But if our accepting a particular world of entities is not 
based on a belief in, or assumption of, the reality of that world of 
entities, then why do we accept such a world? That is/ on what do we 
base a deciSion to accept or to reject a particular linguistic 
framework? Carnap argues that although the practical decision itself is 
not theoretical or cogni ti ve, nevertheless it will be influenced by 
theoretical knowledge. What factors are relevant to the decision will 
1 Ibid., p. 208. 
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be deteDmined by what the language is to be used for. For example, if 
the purpose of the language is to communicate factual knowledge, then 
the crucial factors to be considered, Carnap suggests, might be 
efficiency, fruitfulness, and simplicity of the linguistic framework in 
question. Now, questions as to what extent the linguistic framework in 
question -- in this case the thing linguistic framework -- has these 
qualities are theoretical questions. That is, the answers to them are 
matters of fact, which we come to know through our empirical 
experiences. However, Carnap emphasizes that these questions cannot be 
identified with the question of realism. They are questions of degree, 
not yes-no questions as is the question of realism. It is a matter of 
fact, which we know from experience, that the thing linguistic framework 
is very well suited to the purpose of communicating factual knowledge. 
It is simple, fruitful and highly efficient when used for this purpose. 
But this is not to say that the thing world is real, nor even that it is 
likely that it is real. Carnap writes: 
'However, it would be wrong to describe this situation by 
saying: "The fact of the efficiency of the thing language is 
confiDming evidence for the reality of the thing world" ; we 
should rather say instead: 1 "This fact makes it adVisable to 
accept the thing language'" . 
Now, we have just seen Carnap's distinction between internal 
and external questions as it applies to a factual linguistic framework. 
Questions asked wi thin a given factual linguistic framework about the 
reality of particular entities are theoretical or cognitive questions. 
Their answers are to be found in empirical observations, in accordance 
".,vi th the rules for evaluating evidence which form part of that 
1 Ibid., p. 208. 
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linguistic framework. The external question, purportedly concerning the 
reality of the whole world of relevant entities, cannot be meaningfully 
interpreted as a cognitive question. Rather, it can only be understood 
as a practical question, concerning whether we should accept or reject 
the linguistic framework in question. We shall now briefly exarrdne an 
example Carnap gives of a logical linguistic framework to see how his 
fundamental distinction applies to it. The logical linguistic framework 
which Carnap describes is the one for the system of natural numbers. 
Internal questions for the natural number linguistic framework 
are questions like 'Is there a prime number greater than a hundred?'. 
In this case the answers to such questions are not to be found by 
empirical investigation on the basis of the rules for evaluating 
evidence. Rather, they are to be found by logical analysis, based on 
the rules for natural numbers which form part of the linguistic 
framework. Thus the answers are logically true, or analytic. 
In addition, however, the question 'Are there numbers?', or 
'Do numbers exist?', can be meaningfully interpreted as an internal 
question in this logical linguistic framework, contrary to the 
comparative question in a factual linguistic frameworK. Carnap pOints 
out that 
'there is the internal question which, together with the 
affirmative answer, can be formulated in the new terms, say, 
by "There are numbers" or, more explicitly, "There is an n 
such that n is a number". This statement follows from the 
analytic rtatement "Five is a number" and is therefore itself 
analytic' . 
1 Ibid., p. 209. 
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Thus, as carnap argues, nobody who meant the question 'Do numbers 
exist? I as an internal question would seriously consider a negative 
answer. 
However, as Carnap continues, philosophers see this question 
as posing a serious philosophical problem, and there have been 
protracted arguments for each answer. From this he infers that they do 
not mean the question to be taken in the internal sense. They do not 
intend the question to be asked Within the natural number linguistic 
framework. Rather, they intend it to be asked prior to the acceptance 
of that linguistic framework. As carnap explains, they are asking about 
the ontological status of numbers: that is, whether or not numbers are 
real, or exist as independent entities (though, of course, they would be 
real or exist in a non-rraterial sense). Carnap argues that these 
philosophers have failed to formulate this question in terms of the 
common scientific language, and that therefore they have failed to give 
the question any cognitive content. Therefore, Carnap concludes, their 
question is only meaningful if interpreted as the practical question of 
whether or not to accept the natural number linguistic framework. As a 
theoretical question it fails: it is a pseudo-question. 
Thus, we have seen an example of each of the two kinds of 
linguistic frameworks: factual and logical. And we have seen the two 
kinds of meaningful questions -- internal and external -- as applied to 
each linguistic framework. Theoretical or cogni ti ve questions are 
internal questions those asked within a particular linguistic 
framework -- and are unproblematic. External questions -- those asked 
about the linguistic framework as a whole -- are non-cognitive practical 
120 
questions (such as 'Should we accept this linguistic framework?' ). With 
respect to these latter questions Carnap says the following: 
'The acceptance cannot be judged as being either true or false 
because it is not an assertion. It can only be judged as 
being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the a~ 
for which the language is intended. Judgments of this kind 
supply the motivation for t£e deciSion of accepting or 
rejecting the kind of entities' . 
We have also seen that there is another kind of external "question" 
which only philosophers ask. They hold that we should ask an 
ontological question about the system of entities as a whole. They hold 
that we should only accept the linguistic framework in question when the 
answer to this ontological question is that the system of entities i s 
real. But we have seen that carnap argues that such "questions" turn 
out to be pseudo-questions, since any alleged external statement of the 
reality of a system of entities is a pseudo-statement. 
Now, I believe that Carnap's account of linguistic frameworks 
and internal and external questions provides us with the basiS for 
clarifying the issues which concern us in this thesis . However, i n 
making use of his account in what follows, we will go a deal further 
than Carnap himself does. Thus, what follows will in part be a 
development of Carnap's account, and one with which he probably would 
not be at all comfortable. Carnap's concern is with scientific language 
and its progress towards being the ideal language. Our concern is qui te 
different. 
1 Ibid., p. 214. 
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CaInap I s impOrtant insight 
I consider carnap's most crucial insight to be one which he never 
actually states, but seems merely to presuppose -- perhaps because it 
seemed to h~ too obvious to mention. It is that any cognitive question 
that we ask, or cognitive statement that we make, is necessarily asked 
or made within a particular linguistic framework. Though this 
presupposition seems obvious and innocuous, it has drastic consequences 
for metaphysical realism, as we will see in the remainder of this 
chapter. 
In addition to this insight we will employ a distinction which 
carnap does not explicitly draw between accepting a linguistic framework 
and operating within a linguistic framework. We each accept countless 
different linguistic frameworks. For example, we Westerners all accept 
the thing linguistic framework, the number linguistic framework, some 
fonn of ethical linguistic framewo~k (we make statements about what we 
should and should not do), and so on. And we can legitimately be said 
to accept them all simUltaneously. 
are proficient in that linguistic 
All 'accept' means here is that we 
framework, and that there are 
situations in which we would operate within that linguistic framework 
because we judge that it is fruitful or conducive to our a~ to do so . 
Now, t~ere are degrees of acceptance. One l~ting case, for example, 
is where I might find the Skinnerian mechanistic account of hurren 
behaviour a particularly impoverished one I but nevertheless I will 
operate within that linguistic framework in answering an exam question, 
solely because I know it to be the examiners' preferred linguistic 
framework in the analysis of hurran behaviour. In such a case I may 
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arguably be said barely to accept the Skinnerian linguistic framework. 
At the other end of the spectrum, however, there can be no argument 
about the cla~ that I accept the thing linguistic framework: I operate 
within it a great deal of the time. 
Now, it was mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 1 that 
Carnap does not make the distinction that we were about to draw between 
uses of the concept linguistic framework which have fairly mundane 
uninteresting implications, and uses of the concept which have far 
deeper more interesting implications in particular , relatiVistic 
implications. At the deeper level, different linguistic frameworks give 
rise to different and incommensurable world-Views. As we have seen in 
the preVious chapter, it is exclusively this level that concerns 
DaVidson in his investigations of the concept of conceptual schemes (or 
linguistic frameworks). 
However, I believe that it is very revealing to follow Carnap 
in not focussing immediately on the dramatic inc ommen surabiIi ty of 
world-Views at this deep level. As we saw in Chapter 1, at the more 
mundane level different linguistic frameworks deal with different parts 
or aspects of the unique real world. Thus, although each linguistic 
framework thereby gives rise to a different View of the unique real 
world, all of these Views taken together are compatible. Hence., if this 
mundane level were all that there was to the concept of linguistic 
frameworks, then all linguistic frameworks taken together would fODn a 
unique consistent language -- language as such. But even if this were 
the case, one still would have to take care that whenever one asked a 
question or made a statement about any particular entity, one asked or 
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made it with in the appropriate linguistic framework. So, for example, 
if someone were to say that we cannot be certain that 7+5=12, since we 
might find out by exhaustive empirical investigation that 7 things plus 
5 things occasionally add up to 13 things, then that person would be 
operating in a linguistic framework inappropriate to the statement 
'7+5=12'. The linguistic framework appropriate to this statement is the 
natural number linguistic framework, which has a logical nature. The 
person disputing that 7+5=12 is operating in a factual linguistic 
framework, one dealing with things in the material world. The rules of 
evidence in such a linguistic framework are completely different from 
the rules of logical proof in the natural number linguistic framework. 
The mistake the person in this example would be making is something akin 
to the old notion of a category mistake. I think that the notion of a 
linguistic framework as used at this mundane level is qui te 
uncontroversial -- even Davidson would allow this use. But I think it 
is of considerable value to us to, investigate it here, so as to draw out 
just how the notion as used at the deep level is different -- that is, 
just how it is that different linguistic frameworks/world-views are 
incornnensurable . 
So, let us consider a case we have previously seen as an 
example of different linguistic frameworks giving rise to different and 
incommensurable world-views . Consider again a monist linguistic 
framework (a la Spinoza) and a pluralist linguistic framework. Suppose 
that a monist and a pluralist are having a philosophical dispute with 
one another. And suppose that the monist only ever operates wholly 
within the monist linguistic framework, and the pluralist only ever 
operates wholly within the pluralist linguistic framework. (We are 
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supposing this for the sake of argument only. We shall return to 
corrment on such suppositions shortly.) Now, suppose that during the 
dispute the pluralist points to an object and says, 'That so-and-so is 
an individual existent'. If the monist were then to say to the 
pluralist, 'No, you are wrong: that object is merely a so-and-so-ish 
rranifestation of the one substance', then I hold that she would be 
making a mistake in exactly the same sense as we have just seen in the 
previous paragraph. The pluralist's statement was made in the pluralist 
linguistic framework. The monist, however, interpreted it in terms of 
the monist linguistic framework. This latter linguistic framework is 
not appropriate for dealing with the object that the pluralist is 
talking about; the pluralist linguistic framework is. The monist 
linguistic framework is not appropriate just as the thing linguistic 
framework is not appropriate for dealing with numbers. 
Now, it may well be objected here that the two cases are 
patently not the same. In the case of the thing linguistic framework 
and the number linguistic framework, each framework deals with different 
parts or aspects of the world. Thus, the objects that each is concerned 
wi th are different, and each is inappropriate for dealing with the 
other's objects. In the above pluralist-monist case, however, the 
objects that each linguistic framework is suited to dealing with are 
identical -- namely any objects which we might encounter around us via 
the senses. Now, such an object is the one pOinted at by the pluralist 
in our example. So it is not the case that the monist linguistic 
framework is inappropriate for dealing with the objects which the 
pluralist is referring to. And thus (so the objection goes), we have 
not made a mistake akin to a category mistake. 
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Now, in answering this objection we will elaborate camap's 
account in a way which, once again, he perhaps would not wish to 
endorse. In our development we allow that there are linguistic 
frameworks within linguistic frameworks. 
Linguistic frarreworks within linguistic frarreworks 
In saying that the pluralist and the monist are dealing with the same 
object, we are operating in a linguistic framework which encompasses 
both the monist linguistic framework and the pluralist linguistic 
framework. This more general, or higher level, linguistic framework is 
the phenomenalist linguistic framework. In this framework we deal with 
phenomena, or object-appearances -- for example, we deal with house-
appearances, and heat-appearances, and Bob-Hawke-appearances, and so on. 
Now, to make anything more of these object-appearances we will operate 
in more specific linguistic frameworks wi thin (as subsets) this more 
general framework. Thus, we may choose to operate in the monist 
linguistic framework, in which we say that each object-appearance is a 
mode of the one substance; or we may choose to operate in the pluralist 
linguistic framework, in which we say that each object-appearance is an 
indiVidual existent. Or indeed, we may choose to operate in any number 
of other frameworks: such as the sense data linguistic framework, in 
which we s·ay that the object-appearances are nothing but isolated 
appearances -- that is, that they are not appearances of anything. 
However, returning to our example, gi ven that the person 
pointing to the object is obViously operating in a pluralist linguistic 
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framework, then there are only two meaningful responses open to us . 
First, we can also operate in the pluralist linguistic framework, and 
adjudge her statement as true or false based on the rules of that 
framework -- in which case we would adjudge her statement true. 
Alternatively, if we do not accept the pluralist linguistic framework, 
then we can operate in the wider phenomenalist linguistic framework --
in which case we would make some statement to the effect that the 
pluralist has accepted a linguistic framework which is less expedient, 
or less fruitful (etc.), than some other framework: say, the the monist 
framework. We cannot make a meaningful response if we are operating 
within the monist linguistic framework, because we cannot even make 
sense of the pluralist's statement if we are operating wi thin that 
framework. This is because we cannot even recognize the object of the 
pluralist's statement except by operating in the phenomenalist 
framework, and thereby seeing that the object-appearance which the 
pluralist points out as an individual eXistent is what we as monists 
point out as a mode of the one substance. 
Thus, if the pluralist is operating wholly within the 
pluralist linguistic framework, and we are operating wholly within the 
monist linguistic framework, then the objects about which she and we are 
speaking are different; even though it is obvious from within the 
phenomenalist framework that she and we are pointing out the same 
object-appearance. Hence, we have just seen the argument for the claims 
above that the pluralist linguistic framework is inappropriate for 
dealing with the object of the monist's statement, and that therefore 
the pluralist's claim that the monist is wrong constitutes a mistake 
akin to a category mistake. 
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Now, the example we have just seen illustrates our first 
development of Carnap's account: we hold that there are (more specific) 
linguistic frameworks within (more general) linguistic frameworks. It 
is difficult to judge whether Carnap would be happy with this 
development, since he does not explicitly deal with the question. But 
regardless of his opinion, I hold furthermore that there are any number 
of levels of linguistic frameworks that is, frameworks within 
frameworks within frameworks, and so on. To see what effects this has 
on our quasi -carnapian account, we shall next re-examine a question 
concerning a logical linguistic framework. 
ConSider once again the natural number linguistic framework. 
As we saw earlier in this chapter, Carnap holds that there are only two 
ways in which the question 'Are numbers real?' can be meaningfully 
interpreted. First, it can be interpreted as an internal question, in 
which case the answer is triVially affirmative. This interpretation is 
the only cognitive one. Secondly, it can be interpreted as an external 
practical question about the linguistic framework as a whole: that is, 
the question whether we should accept the natural number linguistic 
framework or not. Carnap draws a sharp distinction between cognitive 
questions and practical questions. Cognitive or theoretical questions 
are by definition internal questions -- they are asked within a 
particular linguistic framework; and their answers are determined 
according to the rules of that linguistic framework, and stated within 
that framework. Practical questions, however, are external questions --
they are asked outside of a linguistic framework, about that linguistic 
framework. 
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However, our cla~ that there are different levels of 
linguistic frameworks provides us with another possible interpretation 
of the question 'Are numbers real?'. This third interpretation makes 
the question an external one -- that is, asked outside of the natural 
number linguistic framework - and yet, nevertheless, a cogni ti ve or 
theoretical one. This is possible just if the question is interpreted 
as being asked within a wider linguistic framework, which encompasses 
the natural number linguistic framework. So, for example, if we 
understand the question as being asked within the set theory linguistic 
framework, then it is a cognitive or theoretical question, whose answer 
we can determine according to the rules of the set theory linguistic 
framework. If we discover that the natural number system can be 
constructed from the axioms of set theory (which they can), then we have 
proven that the answer to the question 'Are numbers real?' is 
affirmative. (I am not suggesting that this example can be generalized; 
that all ontological questions can be decided within some subsuming 
linguistic framework or other. Indeed, I have not been able to think of 
a similar example from a factual linguistic framework. Certainly, 
although the monist and pluralist linguistic frameworks are subsumed by 
the phenomenalist linguistic framework, the ontological issue at stake 
between them is not decidable Wi thin this, or any other, subsuming 
framework. ) 
Of course, when philosophers ask the question 'Are numbers 
real?', they do not intend the question to be understood as internal to 
the natural number linguistic framework, nor internal to the set theory 
linguistic framework, nor for that matter internal to any linguistic 
framework at all. They are concerned with the absolute reality of 
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numbers, independent of all frameworks: theirs is an ontological 
question; allegedly both cognitive and external. 
Now, we have already seen that carnap holds that the question 
'Are numbers real?', when intended in this philosophical way, is 
meaningless -- a pseudo-question. However, if we examine in more detail 
his response, we Will see a crucial difference between his account of 
linguistic frameworks and our developnent of his account. Carnap 
writes: 
'Unfortunately, these philosophers have so far not given a 
formulation of their question in terms of the common 
scientific language. Therefore our judgment must be that they 
have not succeeded in giving to the exte~l question and to 
the possible answers any cognitive content' . 
Now, my response to carnap here is that of course these philosophers 
have not given a fonnulation of their question in common scientific 
terms. If anyone were to give a fonnulation of these philosophers' 
question in common scientific terms, then it would not be their 
question: that is, it would not be the external philosophical question 
, Are numbers real?'. Rather, it would be an internal scientific 
question; just as the question 'Are numbers real?', asked in set theory 
terms, is an internal set theory question and not a philosophical 
question. The point here is that in our account the whole language of 
science is just another linguistic framework. Admittedly it is a vast 
one, but it is by no means an all-encompassing framework. 
Now, I agree With Carnap that the philosophical question 'Are 
numbers real?' is a pseudo-question, without cognitive content, but not 
1 Ibid., p. 209. 
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quite for the same reason as carnap gives. Carnap rejects the questi on 
because so far philosophers have failed to fonnulate it in corrrnon 
scientific terms -- as if it were the case that it is at least possible 
that they might provide such a fonnulation; and that if they did so 
succeed, then they would be asking a philosophical question with 
cogni ti ve content. But by our account, as we have seen, they would 
simply be asking a run-of-the-mill internal scientific question. Our 
reason for rejecting the philosophical question 'Are numbers real?' is 
based on the essential nature of philosophical questions: that is, they 
are supposed to be concerned with ultimate reality, or reality per se, 
and not rea Ii ty as defined by some linguistic framework or other; and 
hence, their nature is supposed to be both cogni ti ve and absolutely 
external. But according to our account, whatever is expressed 
linguistically must be expressed in some particular linguistic framework 
or other. And therefore, there can be no genuinely external cognitive 
question; from which follows that there can be no meaningful 
philosophical questions, such as 'Are numbers real?'. 
Pseudo-relatiVism 
OUr quasi -Carnapian account of linguistic frameworks at the mundane 
level can lead us into what I will call 'pseudo-relativism'. As the 
name implies, the doctrine is not true relativism, but the reasons that 
it is not are illuminating with respect to true relativism at the deep 
level. In developing this false doctrine, we will consider examples 
which will be found implausible; but the reasons why they are 
implausible are illuminating. 
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==a ...... er,·;o:-:<s :a2..:< about di::::erent ob ' ects . ...:md we said that therefore, i f 
s~~one on:_' e -e:- operated in the monist linguistic framework, then that 
pe:-son .;ould be tmable to interpret the pluralist / s statement 'This so-
CJ"I..ci-so ~s all t:1dividua_ existent / correctly. But now consider our 
everyday discourse I i:1 r,mich r,.;e move naturally from one linguistic 
::::a-reHO:-.( ~o anoJ..jer, as we taLI( about different sub jects (such as t he 
-- . , Qr tfea W_'-'_ , cur::-ent events , politics, philosophy, sport, other people, 
~terpersonal relationships, SCience, etc. ) to different kinds of people 
( suc~ as aquaintances, colleagues, close friends, strangers, children, 
:overs, cioctors, students, etc. ) . If we were to attend closely to this 
ever-cnangi.-ng discourse I we might discover not only that we operate 
-,.;:t.~2.n dif=erent linguistic frameworks as we discourse about different 
subjects with different correspondents, but further, that the statements 
. 
:TIade ~n one linguistic framer,<lork either do not rmke sense, or mean 
something quite different (and unintended ) , if interpreted within 
another linguistic framework. 
Each linguistic framework is concerned with particular subject 
rratter i and even if tvlO frameworks use the same expression to refer to 
their :-esnective subject matters, it may well be that the ob jects thus 
referred to are nevertheless different -- that is, that the expression 
has different meanings as used in the two linguistic frameworks. And 
this is so even in cases where a physical act of pointing is employed in 
an attempt to uniquely identify an object. For example, suppose an 
aesthete friend of mine pOints to a certain church and says I \ That 
church is a particularly beautiful example of gothiC architecture'. She 
is thus operating in an aesthetic linguistic framework. Now, to 
tha.L- . ~ nm '; s-~ C 
--j,,=, ~ -ooerate ~or .... "-'-
~:ec:::-e co:mn .. micat~on -f'low..d not .L-ai<e p_ace, :or examp_e, 
:"~at -H1:en : """ake a state..rr:ent such as ': worship in that church', the 
'::0 :':':e / 'le are st..rpposL'1"lg, ..... he word 'church' has a 
- e::y per-sor-a..:... and ~ :nporL-a.n..... :neaning: i.... means the place where I corrmune 
-L .... ~'l Gx. '::o:ny :=:end, however, it si..mply means a bUilding - albeit a 
particu.':..ar:"'y beaut::w. one. Now, if it were the case that the word. 
'chu=ch' and t..~e sight of my place of holy corrmunion caused. me to think 
on: in ..... er:ns of the :-eligious linguistic framework, then clearly I 
-,.;ow..d :ai: to understand my companion's statement. 
_ -0-";, _e- us consider one more such (admittedly irnplausibie ) 
exar:-n:"'e. T::ragj ne a Keen _ Otmg Il.lI1ner from the outback, who learns 
easi:'" , ~n :_e= f:":-st ever lesson at school, the linDortance of w-aDTting up 
before :-acir.g i but then is con:ronted. With the totally unfamil~ar 
gecmetry .l.L'"1guistic frameworK, and is unable to rrake any sense of the 
conceDts 0: area 0: a Circle, radius, pi, and the square of a number. 
( :'-_e=e ~n jOur Dody is pi?' i 'If you square your numbe!' , does it make 
'ou ~Jn :as.L-e!,?/ ) Clearly, the statements of one linguistic framework 
cannot De understood from w~thin the other. 
_ow, the DO~nt of .L-he examples we have just seen is that even 
at t e rmmdane _evel linguistic frameworKs are incomnensurable. That 
:"s, at .L-his level dif:erent linguistic framework's deteDTtine that 
dif:erent objects, qualities, concepts, etc., are real. wnen we operate 
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moll within ~he athletics lingu.istic framework, there are bodies 
containing muscles supplied with oxygen by the blood, and so on; but 
circles and pi and squares of numbers are not part of the Real as 
characterized by this framework. And similarly, the Real as 
characterized by the geometry linguistic framework includes Circles and 
pi, but bodies and muscles are not real. In the religious linguistic 
framework there are God, prayer, comnunion, The Holy Ghost, sin, 
redemption, and so on; whereas, the aesthetic linguistic framework 
instead detenmines that beauty, fODm, colour, proportion, physical works 
of art, and so on, are real. And finally, the pluralist linguistic 
framework detenmines that there are individuals, externality, creation, 
destruction, and change; whereas, the monist framework admits only one 
existent: being, in its infinite modes, which alters but does not 
change. And thus, we might conclude from such examples that even at the 
rmmdane level the Real, or what there is, is relative to the linguistic 
framework in which the knower operates. 
However, the relativist thesis just expressed is false. If we 
reconsider the examples we used to reach it, we will see just why it is 
false. 
Pseudo-relativism crt ticized. 
In the monism-pluralism case, we admitted that these two linguistic 
frameworks can be subsumed by <3. third - namely, the phenomenalist 
linguistic framework -- wi thin which both can be seen as alternative 
ways of describing the same data. Nevertheless, we said that if the 
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monist and pluralist both operated exclusively in their respective 
linguistic frameworks, then they would not be able to illlderstand one 
another. But this is to ignore the important fact that no one ever does 
operate in either of these frameworks exclusively. And similarly, in 
the aesthetics-religion and geometry-athletics cases, we tried to 
concoct examples in which someone failed to recognize that they were 
operating in the inappropriate linguistic framework, and hence failed to 
interpret another's statements -correctly. But in reality we move 
easily -- indeed, largely unconsciously -- from one framework to another 
at this mundane level. Thus, we are mostly in the appropriate framework 
to undertand and to judge the statements of others. 
Occasionally, however, we do find that we are operating in an 
inappropriate linguistic framework, and must deliberately shift to the 
appropriate one. This may happen, for example, when we come upon a 
conversation between two other speakers and interpret a few heard words 
within a particular linguistic framework, only to become more and more 
confused as the conversation progresses and the statements appear more 
and more incongruous. (The portrayal of such misunderstandings is a 
favouri te technique of comedians.) When we become thus confused, we 
struggle to re-interpret the statements in a way which makes the 
conversation more congruous -- that is, we search for a familiar 
linguistic framework which makes sense of the whole conversation. 
Furthermore, sometimes we are quite unable to shift to the appropriate 
framework to understand a given statement, simply because we are not 
proficient in the framework. For example, there are innumerable 
linguistic frameworks which I am unfamiliar with, such as many 
mathematical frameworks, many modem physics frameworks, frameworks 
135 
concerned with economic theories, etc. 
But what it is all-important to remember at this mundane 
_evel, and what makes the thesis of relativism at this level false, is 
that all of these linguistic frameworks are subsumed by our modern 
Western culture's linguistic framework/world-view. This vast linguistic 
framework has a particular style of reasoning, which all linguistic 
frameworks within it share, and hence can be assessed against. Thus, 
there is crucial corrmon ground between all the linguistic frameworks in 
our world-view: these linguistic frameworks are commensurable. This is 
why we can easily shift from one (mundane) linguistic framework to 
another, even when they are rivals that is, when they are 
incompatible. Indeed, it explains how it is that they can be subsumed 
oy another more general linguistic framework, and hence recognized as 
rivals. And it explains why different linguistic frameworks, which 
admit the existence of different objects, can be recognized as being 
compatible: that is, because they can be recognized as describing 
different aspects or parts of the one real world as characterized by our 
Western world-view. Whatever mundane linguistic framework someone of 
our culture is operating in, that person is operating in the modern 
Western linguistic framework, and hence is operating with the modern 
Western style of reasoning. Because of this, she can corne to understand 
and judge any statement in any linguistic framework wi thin our world-
view, as long as she has the intellectual capacity, and takes the 
trouble, to become proficient in the appropriate linguistic framework. 
However, the case of someone from another culture, with 
respect to our linguistic frameworks, is completely different. For 
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example, consider again the aesthete I s statement 'That church is a 
particularly beautiful example of gothic architecture!. What would be 
involved in our imaginary aborigine corrdng to understand this statement? 
I think it is plausible to assume that it would not be possible to 
translate this sentence adequately into the aboriginal language: let us 
assume that the aboriginal culture has no concept of the aesthetics of 
a man-made building, let alone the concept of different styles of 
building. Furthermore, let us assume that the aborigines' only art is 
representational and narrative -- that is, that they have no concept of 
beauty in respect of artworks. Now , given these differences, it is 
clearly not a simple matter for the aborigine to come to comprehend the 
meaning of the aesthete's sentence. To come to comprehend this meaning, 
she would have to acquire the notion of aesthetic beauty as a function 
of the fonn of a hurran constuction, the harmony of proportion, the 
quantity of light which floods the interior, and the sheer scale of a 
structure. But all this could not be learned by her in isolation from 
all our other linguistic frameworks. She would also need to learn the 
religious significance of the kinds of buildings which were built in the 
gothic style, and what the light and scale in such architecture 
symbolized. And therefore, she would need to learn totally foreign ways 
of reasoning. 
These foreign ways of reasoning could not just be added to her 
own ways of reasoning: the foreign ways are of a style incompatible with 
her own cuI ture ' s style. Thus, she could only learn these different 
ways of reasoning by learning fonn scratch to operate within our 
culture's linguistic framework/world-view; that is, by "forgetting" her 
own culture's style of reasoning, and learning to reason in our style. 
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Thus, she would learn the logic of our language, what evidence is and 
how it either supports or falsifies a thesis, and what the fundamental 
concepts are and how they are employed. And hence we can see just how 
it is that our two linguistic frameworks/world-views are 
incorrmensurable . 
Relativism 
We have seen that our mundane linguistic frameworks, which Carnap is 
concerned with, are all subsumed by our Western culture's linguistic 
framework; the common ground shared by all of our linguistic frameworks 
being our culture's style of reasoning. Therefore, although we only 
operate in one (mundane) linguistic framework at a time, it is not the 
case that we accept as real at that time only the particular kinds of 
entities which that framework is corrrrdtted to. Because these frameworks 
are all subsumed by our culture's linguistic framework/world-view, we, 
as members of our culture, actually accept all of the entities as real 
which the various non-rival linguistic frameworks are corrmi tted to. 
That is, our culture's linguistic framework characterizes a real world, 
composed of many different kinds of entities. We accept and operate in 
this linguistic framework, and thereby accept as real the world thus 
characterized. The linguistic frameworks within this subsuming 
framework deal with different aspects and parts of the world. Now, 
becuase there are some rival linguistic frameworks, the world is not 
well-defined in all of its parts and aspects. However, our style of 
reasoning does determine that many linguistic frameworks are not 
acceptable, and therefore they cannot fODn part of our culture's 
linguistic framework/world-view 
framework. 
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such as the astrology linguistic 
Now, following Carnap (and Putnam), the external philosophical 
"question" of whether the world as characterized by our Western 
culture's linguistic framework is real is a pseudo-question, without 
cognitive content. The asking of it presupposes a fictional God's Eye 
view; a radically non-epistimic notion of truth, which is untenable. It 
is simply the case that we accept the Western linguistic framework, 
which is ontologically corrrrdtted to this world. But, there are other 
linguistic frameworks/world-views such as the aboriginal one 
discussed above, which is incommensurable with ours, because it has a 
different style of reasoning. This linguistic framework characterizes a 
world too, consisting of quite different entities to ours. The 
incommensurability of the frameworks means that there can be no 
linguistic · framework which subsumes both our culture's linguistic 
framework, and the aboriginal culture's linguistic framework. And 
therefore, there can be no cognitive question as to which of the 
alternative worlds is real. Hence, we come to the relativist 
conclusion: the Real, or what there is, is relative to the linguistic 
framework, or world-view, accepted by the knower. 
So we return to our relativist model from Chapter 2 of many 
incommensurable linguistic frameworks, each characterizing a real world . 
But, in that Chapter we mounted an objection to this model, based on 
Putnam's view of reference, and the incommensurability of linguistic 
frameworks (pp. 85-88) . We argued that to know the object to which 
someone refers, we must operate in the same linguistic framework as that 
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person. But then, we argued, we cannot refer to alternative linguistic 
frameworks to our own. Admitting such alternatives presupposes a 
radically non-episterrdc notion of truth -- a God's Eye view -- which we 
reject as a fiction. And thus, we were lead to our wholly internalist 
Davidson-like model. 
However, the answer to this objection to the relativist model 
lies in translation. We have seen that translation can be achieved of 
one culture's linguistic framework into that of another. In this way we 
can come to identify and to know about another culture's world; though 
we do not thereby come to know that world, in the sense of being 
acquainted With it. To come to know an alternative world we must 
actually live Within it: that is, learn to operate in the actual 
linguistic framework, by living With the people in that culture, and 
thereby learning to think as the people of that culture do. In other 
words, we must come to accept the alternative linguistic framework. Few 
people achieve this, though good translators should. But all I think we 
need, to satisfy Putnam's essential conditions for reference, is either 
that someone from our world carnes to know the other world, and manages 
to point it out to us and tell us about it, or that someone from the 
other world comes to live in ours, and does the same thing -- that is, 
we are shown the people as they live their lives, and are told about 
their world-view in our own language. In this way, alternative 
linguistic frameworks/world-views are identified and characterized in 
our linguistic framework, though the foreign linguistic frameworks 
themselves are not part of our linguistic framework, and therefore they, 
and the alternati ve worlds-as-characterized, cannot be known in our 
linguistic framework -- they are not real. Hence, we can conclude that 
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our relativist model is wholly internalist, presupposing only the 
epistemic notion of truth. 
Truth within linguistic frarrewrks 
In the various relativist models in this thesis, we have maintained a 
common sense account of internal truth, which we introduced in Chapter 1 
(pp.30-32). According to this account, a statement made within a given 
linguistic framework/world-view is true just if what it states to be the 
case is in fact the case in the world-as-characterized-by-that-
linguistic-framework. What this amounts to in practice is that one must 
identify the relevant evidence in that world-view, as determined by the 
style of reasoning of that linguistic framework, and then reason in 
accordance vlith that style to decide whether the statement is warranted. 
Now, this account may be perfectly COmrnDn sense in our 
culture's linguistic framework, but in other cultures' linguistic 
frameworks it may not be so. In other cultures' linguistic frameworks 
there may well be no accounts of what it is for a statement to be true. 
It ~s only our culture's linguistic framework which is so preoccupied 
Nith truth and ~alsity of statements, and criticiSJm and falsification, 
and theoretical knowledge. It is only for our culture that it is 
vi tally important to continue to progress towards true accounts of how 
things are ~n the world, by critically questioning every claim to 
Knowledge, and attempting to falsify every theory about how things are. 
Indeed, it is only for our theoretical culture that metaphYSical realism 
versus relativism is an issue at all. 
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For this reason, we must take care that our defence of the 
imaginary aborigines' world-view against cri ticisrn by the scientific 
world-view -- for example, on the grounds of technological superiority 
of the scientific world-view, as in Chapter 1 -- is not misguided . We 
must bear in mind that it is not the purpose of the defence to champion 
the aboriginal world-view. OUr sole purpose in mounting the defence in 
Chapter 1 was to prove, Within our own modern theoretical culture, that 
there is no criterion or argument by which this culture can conclude 
that its world-view is more correct than that of some other culture . 
Such a defence is necessarily mounted Within our modern Western 
linguistic framework, employing its theoretical style of reasoning --
even though it is an elaboration or expianation of the aboriginal world-
view. And thus, such a defence could never be mounted by the aboriginal 
culture itself - that is, it could never be part of the aborigines' 
linguistic framework. Theirs is not a theoretical linguistic framework. 
And it makes no sense to say that our defence is a reconstruction of how 
the aboriginal culture might or would defend its world-view if it 
employed a theoretical style of reasoning. Particular styles of 
reasoning are essential to particular linguistic frameworks/world-views. 
Thus, if we hypothesize a different style of reasoning for a culture, 
then we cease to be talking about that culture and its world-view. To 
see a deferice, such as we mounted of the aborigines' world-view against 
criticism from Within the modern scientific linguistic framework, as a 
reconstuction of what the aborigines might themselves have mounted, is 
thus to fail to realize the depth of the incommensurability of the two 
linguistic frameworks. 
However, although other cultures' linguistic frameworks may 
142 
not have accounts of what it is for a statement to be true, nevertheless 
they do all make statements about their respective worlds; and their 
respective styles of reasoning do constitute criteria by which it is 
detennined what statements are to be accepted, and what are to be 
rejected, or what is the case, and what is not. And hence, we might ask 
of any given linguistic framework whether the world-as-characterized-by-
that-framework measures up adequately against the criteria supplied by 
its own style of reasoning; and hence, whether the world-as-
characterized is in fact real within that linguistic framework. 
Now, in the case of non-Western non-theoretical cultures, like 
the aboriginal culture, I do not think that this question can profitably 
be asked.. The question presupposes a notion which only a theoretical 
culture employs: namely, the notion of anomalies or counterexamples, 
which falsify an account of what is the case. And, more broadly, it 
presupposes the notion of consistency or coherence of an account, which 
a non-theoretical linguistic framework does not share. Therefore, I 
think we must allow that the world-as~characterized-by-such-a-culture's­
linguistic-framework is the real world lived in by that culture. 
However, in the case of theoretical linguistic frameworks --
such as our own culture's framework, and those of earlier scientific 
cultures -- the question of whether the worlds-as-characterized-by-the-
frameworks adequately measure up against the criteria supplied by those 
frameworks can and should be asked. Taking our own culture's linguistic 
framework as an example, our style of reasoning emphasizes that a true 
theory or account must be consistent with all reliable eVidence . 
Therefore, any confinmed anomalies to a theory of what there is, in our 
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culture's linguistic framework, in fact falsify that theory . 
Nevertheless, researchers may persist With such a theory, knoWing it not 
to be correct, in the absence of a better alternative theory, in the 
hope that the theory can be improved, and perhaps eventually explain all 
the evidence. But whilstever there are anomalies to a theory, our style 
of reasoning dictates that the theory is not true; and hence, the aspect 
or part of the world which the theory characterizes should not be 
accepted as real. Therefore, if, say, there were anomalies to the 
current theory of the sub-atorrdc structure of matter, then . our culture 
would have to admit that it did not know how the real world is in the 
sub-atorrdc aspect. In other words, the world-as-characterized-by-our-
linguistic-framework would be ill-defined in this aspect. We would only 
judge that this world-as-characterized failed to measure up adequately 
against the modern Western style of reasoning if there were bona fide 
anomalies to accounts of what there is which our culture held to be 
true. If there are no such cases, then we must allow that the world-as-
characterized-by-our-linguistic-framework is the real world we live in. 
Sirrdlarly, in past cultures' linguistic frameworks that employ 
the notion of consistency of an account With the evidence, we can assess 
their worlds-as-characterized against their own criteria of adequacy 
supplied by their style of reasoning. If such a culture simply ignores 
an anomaly, with no reason that is valid according to their own style of 
reasoning, and accepts as true an account of some aspect of the world, 
then we can judge that their world-as-characterized in that aspect is 
not the real world that they live in. That is, we can judge that in 
this respect they have got things wrong about the world they live in. 
(Indeed, it is such situations which can produce a crisis in a 
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scientific culture, which can in turn lead to a Kuhnian revolution.) 
So, for example, the results of the Michelson-Morley experiment, which 
deteImined that the speed of light is constant, irrespective of the 
frame of reference, was an anomaly to the Newtonian characterization of 
the physical world. This evidence falsified the Newtonian account, 
which, despite the anomaly, was accepted as true at the time. Thus, 
that culture's world-as-characterized did not measure up to the criteria 
for truth provided by the style of reasoning of its own linguistic 
framework. And hence, we can judge that its world-as-characterized is 
not real in all its aspects. The real world for that culture is less 
wellldefined than the culture was prepared to admit. 
However, I think that we must assume that the world-as-
characterized-by-a-linguistic-framework is more or less the real world 
lived in by the theoretical culture concerned. If such a culture was 
adjudged by someone to have got much of its world-as-characterized 
wrong I then we would have to assume that that person had misread the 
style of reasoning which she assigned to that culture's linguistic 
framework. For it would be a very dubious judgement to assign a style 
of reasoning to the linguistic framework of a culture, which that 
culture largely failed to apply. 
Conclusion: the Relativist Paradox 
We have developed an account of linguistic frameworks, based on Carnap's 
notion, and also employing Hacking's notion of styles of reasoning. In 
this account, the various linguistic frameworks which a given culture 
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operates With are all subsumed by the culture's linguistic framework or 
world-view. This subsuming framework has a characteristic style of 
reasoning, which is the common ground binding the culture's individual 
linguistic frameworks into a world-view. This world-view characterizes 
a world. The world-as-thus-characterized is the real world which the 
culture lives in. Different cultures have different linguistic 
frameworks/world-views, having different styles of reasoning, and 
characterizing different worlds. These world-views are incommensurable, 
by virtue of their different styles of reasoning. Thus, we have come to 
our relativist conclusion: the Real, or what there is, is relative to 
the linguistic framework accepted by the knower. And we have finally 
settled on our relativist model of many incommensurable linguistic 
frameworks, each characterizing a real world. This model, we have seen, 
is wholly internalist, presupposing only an episterrrrc notion of truth: 
translation enables us to identify alternative world-views from Within 
our own, although we cannot know the actual alternative worlds. 
Having reached our relativist conclusion, we should finally 
consider the Relativist Paradox. The Relativist Paradox is generated in 
the folloWing way. The statement of relativism -- that is, that the 
Real is relative to the linguistic framework of the knower -- is made 
Within our Western theoretical linguistic framework. Nevertheless, the 
thrust of the relativist claim is that given any linguistic framework, 
the Real is relative to that framework. However, from this it follows 
that the reality of relativism itself is relative to our linguistic 
framework. And thus ( so the argument goes), the stating of the 
relativist claim generates a reductio ad absurdum: relativism applies to 
all statements in all linguistic frameworks; from which follows that it 
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does not apply to statements in linguistic frameworks other than that in 
which it is stated. 
Now, this "paradox" in fact presents no problem for our 
account of relativism. The argument revealing the "paradox" presupposes 
the externalist perspective, which, of course , relativism does not 
countenance. We readily admit -- indeed, it is fundamental to the 
argument for relativism -- that the statement of relativism is made 
within our Western theoretical linguistic framework; and that therefore 
the reality of relativism is relative to this framework. But, we do not 
thereby see it as being merely relative to our framework -- as if the 
Real could be anything but relative to our framework. In other words, 
those who argue that the relativity of the reality of relativism 
undennines the thrust of the relativist I s claim are presupposing the 
radically non-epistemic notion of truth, which we have rejected as 
untenable. As we have seen, our intention in our argument for 
relativism is to show, within our Western theoretical linguistic 
framework/world-view (where else?), -that the Real is relative to the 
linguistic framework of the knower. 
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